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Judicial decisions rendered during the last half-century have overwhelmingly
favored educational agencies over claims by parents seeking religious
accommodations to public education requirements, no matter what constitutional or
statutory rights were pressed at the tribunal, or when the conflict arose.
Although these claim failures on the constitutional front are noteworthy in
themselves, they are especially striking in the wake of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs) passed by Congress in 1993 and thereafter by at least
eighteen state legislatures, starting in 1993,1 since these statutes were intended to
insulate religious adherents from injuries previously inflicted by the courts.2
This article argues that these religious liberty statutes have failed to achieve their
purpose in educational settings because legislators: (1) incorporated legal standards
into the RFRAs which had previously failed to protect religious liberty and therefore
doomed the laws' effectiveness from the start; (2) passed statutes of general
application without specifically targeting religious freedom in education to ensure
agencies acted in a manner which was consistent with the legislatures' intentions; (3)
did not consider specific activities which were more likely than others to result in
conflict with persons wishing to exercise religious freedom, and which activities
educators could readily accommodate; (4) did not distinguish state interests which
merely served a governmental purpose, from those which were essential to fulfilling
educational agencies' core functions; and (5) focused on legal technicalities such as
"substantial burdens" on religion and the "compelling state interest test," which are
largely bereft of meaning outside of a particular agency's interests.
These deficiencies have made it difficult for judges to apply religious freedom
*Lewis M. Wasserman, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
University of Texas at Arlington. Special thanks to Pamela L. Steen, Esq., Member of the New York Bar, and
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manuscript.
1. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV.
466, 475-76 (2010); Caroline M. Corbin, Animus and the Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act,
JURIST-FORUM (Apr. 23, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04caroline-corbin-religious-freedom.php;,Don
Byrd, KY Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto of Religious Freedom Bill, Baptist Joint Committee for
Religious Liberty (Mar. 28, 2013), bjcmobile.org/ky-legislature-overrides-govemors-veto-of religious-
freedom-bill/.
2. JOHN WrTTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONsTITuTiONAL EXPERIMENT
160-161 (3d ed. 2011) (Professors Witte and Nichols use the phrase "age of statutes" to describe the current
period in Free Exercise jurisprudence. They observe that "[s]ince the early 1980s Congress and state legislatures
have passed aggressive new statutes to offset the [Supreme] Court's narrowing of free exercise protections.").
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legislation to specific cases emanating from educational agencies, to predict when a
religious burden falls within the reach of a statute, and to determine when the
governmental interest overcomes that burden. Moreover, they have effectively ceded
to the courts, power which enables jurists to "fill in the blanks" with their policy
preferences. The goal of this article is to overcome these obstacles and offer guidance
on legislation which protects religious liberty within Establishment Clause limits,
while allowing educational agencies to perform their core functions. 3
In contrast to other areas of political conflict, the RFRA was supported by "one
of the broadest coalitions in recent political history, including Christians, Jews,
Muslims, Sikhs, Humanists, and secular civil liberties organizations."4 Moreover,
coalition members came from the political left as well as the right.5 These voices
were, however, hardly uniform across the political spectrum. Contrary views
appeared from conservatives concerned that accommodations stimulate judicial
activism and may be anti-democratic, and from strict separationist liberals
concerned that religious adherents receive special preferences over other groups.7
What is perhaps unique in the pro-accommodation ranks is the blending of interests
which usually tend to conflict with one another in other areas of politics.8
The high water mark for religious liberty occurred when the Supreme Court
decided Sherbert v. Verne in 1963. In Sherbert the Court expressly held for the
first time that strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating laws burdening free exercise
of religion, and declared unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a
woman who was discharged from herjob rather than work on her Saturday Sabbath.10
In 1990 the Supreme Court jettisoned the Sherbert standard in Employment
Division v. Smith, by holding that laws interfering with religious exercise would face
low-level rational basis scrutiny, at least when they were neutral and generally
applicable, and did not target religious exercise for burdening, or were motivated by
a desire to obstruct religion.I
The reaction to Smith was immediate and mostly negative,12 resulting in the
3. This article uses the term "accommodations" rather than "exemptions." The term accommodations
captures more adequately the range of adjustments educational agencies might make to requests from religious
adherents, whereas the term exemption implies a total excusal from an activity or requirement. Exemption is
used when the relief is total or the term was used by the court whose decision is being discussed.
4. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73
TEx. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994).
5. Id.at210-11.
6. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and Religious
Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473
(1996).
8. See, e.g., Laycock supra note 4, at 2 10-1 1,(listing members of the political coalition which supported
the RFRA).
9. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also discussion infra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
10. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406, 409-10.
11. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, Il1 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants ofFree Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. I (1990); but
see, Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song ofLiberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 245, 245-47 (1991); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine and the Public
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RFRAs. The RFRAs were intended to bring Free Exercise protection back to what
legislators considered the pre-Smith halcyon days, by incorporating the Sherbert
standards into that legislation. This legislative retrospective on religious liberty under
Sherbert was not only rose-colored, but grossly inaccurate. Indeed, as this article will
show, the facts on the ground during the post-Sherbert, pre-Smith era were quite
different than these legislators seem to have believed.' 3
II. FREE EXERCISE FOUNDATIONS
A. Pre-Smith Jurisprudence
In Sherbert v. Verner,14 mentioned earlier, a State denied unemployment benefits
to a woman, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who quit her job rather
than work on her Sabbath. The statute in issue required the worker to be available for
work on Monday through Saturday, but did not expressly require anyone to work on
Saturdays.' 5 The Court framed the issue as: "whether some compelling state interest
enforced in the eligibility provisions of the . . . statute justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right."' 6 The Court found the State
failed to meet that burden, and held that the unemployment compensation board's
denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.' 7
Although the law in Sherbert did not directly prohibit or regulate religiously
motivated conduct, it certainly made it more difficult for Sherbert and others who
deemed Saturday or Friday sacred and preserved for rest and worship.' 8 Indeed, the
Court stated: ". . . to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes
the free exercise of her constitutional liberties."' 9 Further, the Court stated that the
State's statutory scheme expressly "saves the Sunday worshipper from having to
make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1100 (2004)..
13. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1416-17, 1445-49 (1992) (discussing pre-Smith claim failures seeking
religious exemptions).
14. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
15. Id. at 400-01.
16. Id at 406 (Judge Richard Posner has characterized Sherbert as requiring "a comparison of two
burdens: the burden on the person who is seeking a governmental benefit or being denied the benefit as the price
of observing his religion, and the burden on the government of extending the benefit to someone who fails to
meet the usual requirements for eligibility [citation omitted]. The more valuable the benefit to the claimant and
hence the greater the burden on him of foregoing it in order to continue to observe his religion, the greater must
be the burden on the government of relaxing the conditions it places on that benefit for a refusal to make an
exception for the claimant to survive a challenge based on the First Amendment. Free Exercise of religion does
not mean costless exercise of religion, but the state may not make the exercise of religion unreasonably costly."
Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1982).
17. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409-410 (Sherbert requires strict scrutiny over state activity in such
circumstances; therefore, a statute falling within its rule must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
governmental objective); see, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
18. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
19. Id. at 406.
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liberty," 20 since it exempted the conscientious Sunday worshiper from the kind of
refusal to which the appellant was subjected. This, concluded the Court, compounded
the appellant's disqualification by the "religious discrimination" which the statutory
scheme necessarily effected.21
The firmness of Sherbert's language appeared to be a boon to religious liberty.
However, the reality turned out to be quite different. Other than unemployment
compensation disputes involving religious accommodations in the workplace, 22 the
only other case decided between 1963 and 1990 where the Supreme Court found a
Free Exercise violation was Wisconsin v. Yoder.23 Yet Yoder, like Sherbert before it,
became a blueprint for unfulfilled promises. 24
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,2 5 the Supreme Court examined whether Amish parents
had a Free Exercise right to an exemption from Wisconsin's compulsory school laws
for their fourteen and fifteen year old children.26 In extensively examining the Amish
sect's unique history, the Court said:
Aided by . .. three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long
history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society,
the Amish . . . have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their
religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the
vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of
Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the
hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
as to others.2 7
The Yoder court further observed the central place that home-vocational education
played in Amish belief and practice, how that education was implemented to prepare
the children for life within the Amish community, and the success this had produced
over the centuries.28
On these facts, the Yoder Court held that "when the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than
merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is
required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First
2 0. Id.
2 1. Id.
22. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Emp't Income Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-
35 (1989).
23. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. See discussion infra Part VI (this article supports this assertion by examining the outcomes of all
reported United States Courts of Appeals cases in which parents sought from educational agencies religious
accommodations from statutory or regulatory requirements).
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
26. Id at 207.
27. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). Under Amish teaching, participation in high school and higher education
undermines their faith because it is at marked variance with Amish values and way of life. This includes the
impermissible exposure to "worldly" influences. Id. at 210-11.
28. Id. at 218. Indeed, the Court noted the absence of evidence that those Amish who left the community,
with "their valuable vocational skills and habits," would become burdens on society. Id. at 225.
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Amendment." 29 The Court concluded the State had failed to meet its burden.30 The
Yoder Court took pains to limit its holding to the claim revealed in the record, "one
that probably few other religious groups or sects could make." 31
The threat to the Amish community's way of life posed by a compulsory school
attendance statute was central to the holding in Yoder.32 While acknowledging that
"religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the
State,"33 the Yoder Court, relying on, among other precedents, Sherbert v. Verner,
concluded that "there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability."34  The Yoder Court stressed that when
fundamental religious liberty is at stake, even the State's claim of a compelling
interest in enforcing compulsory education laws requires a "searching" examination
of "the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory
education to age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."35
Thus, Yoder, applying Sherbert balancing, weighed the State's interest in
universal education against the fundamental rights of Free Exercise and the
traditional interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children.36
Nevertheless, the Yoder Court emphasized Free Exercise of religion as the ground
for its decision.3 7 Still, Yoder leaves us scratching our heads, since the Court did not
advise us what weight to assign to the two constitutional claims it used to sustain the
result,38 or what tools to employ when one such claim is asserted independently of
the other.
There is dicta in Yoder which, from a contemporary perspective, leaves us further
confused. The Yoder Court insisted that the constitutional right it protected did not
extend to non-religious groups.39 Indeed, the Court indicated:
Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by
the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time ...
their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
29. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 236.
31. Id. at 235-36.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 220.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id. at 213-15 (As to parents' due process right to control the upbringing of their child, the Yoder Court
drew upon Pierce v Society of the Sisters, which held that a compulsory education law requiring all children to
attend public schools violates the Due Process clause (citing Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
37. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236.
38. See id at 213-14, 235-36.
39. Id. at 215 ("A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.").
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philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not
rise to the commands of the Religion Clauses.40
Since Yoder eschewed protection to non-religious groups, and cast the Thoreaus of
the world aside,41 it appears that groups unaffiliated with organized sects and
individual acts of conscience are not protected by the Religion Clauses when
pursuing educational accommodations.42
Given its theoretical cloudiness, Yoder may be fairly characterized as a results-
based decision, tailored to a special situation.43 Moreover, Yoder's meaning today is
perhaps more obscure than when it was decided some forty years ago. This is because
of the Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith." Although Smith
treats Yoder as correctly decided,45 Smith did not resolve the ambiguities created by
Yoder, as explained in the previous paragraphs, or indeed acknowledge they existed.
In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,46 a
Jehovah's Witness asked for a layoff from his manufacturing job and to receive
unemployment benefits, after being transferred to a foundry that supplied military
armaments, because the work violated his religious principles.47 The Indiana
Supreme Court had called the choice a "personal philosophical" one, 48 citing
inconsistencies in the plaintiffs explanation of his beliefs, his practice of them, and
the fact that other Jehovah's Witnesses testified that working on armaments was
"scripturally acceptable."4 9 The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that when a
plaintiff draws a line, "it is not for [the Court] to say [it is] an unreasonable one."50
Thomas made plain that "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs
which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect."51 Thomas's special
contribution to constitutional understanding comes from its recognition that
"[i]ntrafaith differences ... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed"
and that "the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such
differences . . . ."52 This led the Thomas Court to withdraw from sorting heresy from
mainstream doctrine within religious sects,53 in discharging its duty in constitutional
40. Id. at 216.
41. Id. at 215-16.
42. Id. at 216.
43. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private andPublic Education, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 531, 538 (1999) (suggesting that Yoder might require religious accommodations in educational
settings, where the alternatives preferred by the State are more restrictive, and those proposed by adherents
allow attainment of the State's goals). Professor Berg's reading of Yoder is similar to the one for which this
article advocates, except that in light of Free Exercise developments at the Supreme Court, especially in Smith,
this article argues for specific state statutory, rather than a federal constitutional, remedies. See infra Part VI,.
44. 491 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. Id. at 881-82 n.1.
46. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
47. Id.at710-l1.
48. Id. at 714.
49. Id. at 715.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 715-16.
52. Id. at 715.
53. Id at 716.
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interpretation.54 It stated: "Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."5 s
Finally, Thomas makes clear that although courts may not impose rules of doctrinal
conformity, claimed adherents still bear the burden of proving the honesty of their
beliefs and how they apply to the accommodation they requested.56
B. Employment Division v. Smith
Smith involved a Free Exercise challenge by Native Americans to an Oregon
statute which made it a felony to knowingly or intentionally possess peyote, a
hallucinogenic substance. 57  In Smith, employees of a private drug rehabilitation
organization were fired because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of their Native American Church. 8 The State of Oregon rejected their
application for unemployment compensation, pursuant to a statute disqualifying
employees discharged for work-related "misconduct." 59
In his majority opinion, joined by four of his colleagues, Justice Scalia rejected
the employees' Free Exercise claim, declaring that the Free Exercise Clause did not
require an exemption from an otherwise valid law.60 The Smith Court said that the
Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."6 1 The Court
stated: "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise
jurisprudence contradicts that proposition."62 Smith made it plain that a law which
54. Id
55. Id. The Court observed: "[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Id. at 714. The Supreme Court has
adhered to its view in Thomas. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Income Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-35 (1989)
(rejecting the State's argument that since applicant did not belong to an organized church, sect, or denomination,
she was ineligible for a religious exemption entitling her to unemployment compensation benefits).
56. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS, 109-
123 (2006) (supporting the legitimacy of judicial inquiries into sincerely felt versus fraudulent religious
convictions on the one hand, while eschewing requirements for conformity of beliefs to doctrine within religious
groups, on the other hand).
57. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
58. Id. at 874.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 879. Joining Justice Scalia in his majority opinion were Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens and
Kennedy. Justice O'Connor concurred in the Smith judgment, but argued instead that since the Oregon statute
burdened religious exercise, strict scrutiny applied to this claim under Sherbert v. Verner and other precedents.
Id. at 904. Applying strict scrutiny, she concluded that Oregon had a compelling state interest in preventing the
use of peyote. Moreover, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's description of its precedents and
asserted: "The First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices
are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility." Id. at 902. For that reason "[t]he compelling
interest test reflects the First Amendment's mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible
in a pluralistic society." Id. at 903.
61. Id at 879 (citations omitted).
62. Id at 878-79. Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined. The dissenters agreed with Justice O'Connor that the majority mischaracterized the precedents on which
it relied. They asserted that strict scrutiny of laws which burden religion was required. See id. at 908-09.
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incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that one's religious belief
requires (or forbids) is not unconstitutional, if the law is not specifically directed to
religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in
the specified act for nonreligious reasons.63
The Smith Court sharply criticized the use of Sherbert balancing, finding that a
compelling government interest test, while useful in evaluating government
distinctions based on race or government regulation over the content of speech, is
inappropriate in the context of Free Exercise cases. The Court said: "What it
produces in those other fields-equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of
contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it produces here-a private right
to ignore generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly." 64
Justice Scalia commented:
Precisely because 'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost every conceivable religious preference,' and precisely because we
value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of
deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest
order.65
The Court concluded that in light of this country's religious diversity a compelling
interest test applied to requests for exemption would "be courting anarchy." 66
Although the Smith Court recognized that its decision would dismay religious
adherents, it predicted that society, through legislative enactments, would be
63. See id at 879.
64. Id at 886. The Court further explained: "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is
'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,'-contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense." Id. at 885 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court dismissed the
argument that where the generally applicable regulation proscribes conduct which is essential to an individual's
religion, strict scrutiny would then apply. Id. at 886-87. It asserted that the latter proposition would compel
courts to determine the centrality of religious beliefs in Free Exercise cases ("What principle of law or logic can
be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?").
Id. at 887. Further, the Court contended that "[j]udging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to
the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims"', a road down which
it would not travel. Id. (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has construed Smith to mean that such claims are
subject to only rational basis review, an eminently sound reading of Smith. See, e.g., Corder v. Lewis Palmer
Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009).
65. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 888. The Court opined that use of a compelling interest test as the employees proposed "would
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes, to health and safety
regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic
laws, to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws,
environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races. The First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this." Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted). See
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 140, 148 n.38 (2009)
(Professor Laycock has characterized Justice Scalia's opinion as motivated by a fear ofjudicial activism and as
casting his lot with the secular conservatives on this issue).
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"solicitous" of religious values. 67 Notably, the Court was clear in declaring its
preference for accommodationist legislative solutions to state-religion disputes, even
when they were not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. The Court stated:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be
discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence
of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
In 1993 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to apply Smith in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah.69 In Lukumi the Court confronted a claim by Santeria
religionists who use animal sacrifice as one of their principal forms of worship.70
After their killing, animals are cooked and eaten in accord with the Santeria's
rituals.71  Following the Santeria's announcement of plans to build a house of
worship, school, cultural center, and a museum in Hialeah, Florida, the city adopted
an ordinance prohibiting ritual sacrifice of animals. 72  Under the ordinance
"sacrifice" was defined as the killing of animals "not for the primary purpose of food
consumption."73 The prohibition applied only to an individual or group which "kills,
slaughters, or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not
the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed." 74
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous court, held the law was
unconstitutional. The Lukumi Court found that, contrary to Smith's requirements, the
law was not neutral, since its object was to prohibit a religious practice. 75 It noted
that the text of the law referred to "sacrifice" and "ritual" and the ordinance clearly
targeted the Santeria religion.76 The Court focused on exceptions to the ordinance
which permitted the killing of animals by other religions, such as the kosher
slaughtering of animals, and other animal killing for nonreligious purposes.77 This
selectivity in exemption from the ordinance manifested a lack of neutrality of the
law.78 The Court also concluded the law was not one of "general applicability"
within Smith's meaning. It stated that: "[d]espite the city's proffered interest in
67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
68. Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
69. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
70. Id. at 524.
71. Id. at 525.
72. Id. at 525-26.
73. Id. at 527.
74. Id.
75. Id at 533-34.
76. Id. at 535-36.
77. Id. at 536.
78. Id. at 535-42.
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preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few
killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice. Many types of animal deaths or
kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express
provision."79
Because the regulation was neither neutral nor ofgeneral applicability, as Smith
required for less demanding scrutiny to apply, the Court examined the ordinance
under strict scrutiny standards.80
III. THE HYBRID THEORY OF RELIGIOUS INFRINGEMENT
This Part examines the confounding language which appears in Smith concerning
so-called hybrid claims. These claims tether Free Exercise to other claims, usually
those related to due process, freedom of speech or association. Smith implied that
"hybrid situations" which combine a Free Exercise claim with another colorable
cause of action might merit a higher standard than the rational basis review
announced in Smith.8 1 Despite Smith's seeming endorsement of hybrid rights the
existence of such rights remains highly controversial. Justice Souter, for example, in
his Church of the Lukumi concurrence criticized the hybrid rights theory as follows:
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the
situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights
are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in
which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally
neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the
hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.82
79. Id. at 543.
80. Id. at 546-47. Justice Scalia, in an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, wrote separately to argue that the purpose of the ordinance was not relevant to
whether it was neutral or of general applicability. Id. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Justice Souter also wrote separately, contending that the Court should reconsider and overrule Smith.
Id. at 559-577 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment, in an opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, and "emphasize[d] that the First Amendment's
protection of religion extends beyond those rare occasions on which the government explicitly targets religion
(or a particular religion) for disfavored treatment." Id. at 577-78.
81. Id. at 233 (Smith's hybrid reference was rooted, in part, in that portion of the Court's decision in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which held that "when the interests of parenthood are combined with
a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state is required to sustain the validity of the states' requirement under
the First Amendment. "')(internal citation omitted).
82. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 657 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
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The First," Fifth,84 Eighth,s and Tenth 86 Circuit Courts of Appeals have read
Smith to mandate application of stricter scrutiny to hybrid claims. That said, none of
these Courts of Appeals has yet applied strict scrutiny to hybrid claims brought before
them. The District of Columbia Circuit has recognized hybrid religious liberty
claims, but to date has not adjudicated a case which it found fell into that category.87
The Fourth Circuit has not yet decided whether to recognize hybrid claims.88 The
Seventh Circuit has not articulated its approach, but appears to approve of the Ninth
Circuit's then current approach to hybrid claims.89 However, the Ninth Circuit has
been somewhat inconsistent in that it appeared at first to recognize hybrid claims,90
but later appears to have rejected hybrid theory.91
83. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (refusing to decide parents' claim on Smith's
hybrid theory, in light of ambiguities in its meaning and application, and instead treating the Due Process and
Free Exercise claims separately and analyzing them interdependently [as the Court did in Wisconsin v. Yoder],
on the ground that "the two sets of interests informed one another." Id. at 99), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008);
Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist.,
241 F.Supp.2d 111, 121 (D.N.H. 2003) (recognizing hybrid claims, but requiring a plaintiff first to prove that
the Free Exercise claim is joined with an independently viable companion right)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 988
(2004); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (although not explicitly
recognizing the viability of hybrid theory, the court rejected the claim at bar because the "free exercise challenge
[was] thus not conjoined with an independently protected constitutional protection."), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1159 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Soc'y of Separationists v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding the claim,
asserting that being forced to state an oath or affirmation violated freedom of religion and speech provisions,
fell within the "religion-plus-speech" exception to Smith), rehearing en banc granted, 946 F.2d 1573, cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 866 (1992).
85. See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 474 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
existence of hybrid-rights claims, although not defining the contours).
86. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 2004) (criticizing the approach
taken by some courts which required that the claim joining the Free Exercise one be independently viable
stating: "[I]t makes no sense to adopt a strict standard that essentially requires a successful companion claim
because such a test would make the free exercise claim unnecessary[;] [i]f the plaintiffs additional
constitutional claim is successful, he or she would typically not need the free exercise claim and the hybrid-
rights exception would add nothing to the case."); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699-700
(10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that since plaintiff has shown no colorable claim of infringement on the
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of her children, it was not a hybrid rights case; a hybrid-rights
plaintiff must show a fair probability or likelihood, but not certainty of success on the merits of the companion
constitutional claim, and the claimant cannot "simply invoke the parental rights doctrine, combine it with a
claimed free-exercise right, and thereby force the government to demonstrate the presence of a compelling state
interest.").
87. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (seemingly recognizing hybrid
claims, but then rejecting claim made there on ground that "the combination of two untenable claims [cannot]
equal[] a tenable one."), rehearing denied, 265 F.3d 1072, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002); Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that Free Exercise,
Establishment and RFRA independently protected the university from an employment discrimination claim, id.
at 470, but relying on Smith's hybrid theory as an alternative ground for supporting the decision. Id. at 467.).
88. See Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Fed. App'x 348, *353 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting split in
circuits, but refusing to decide hybrid-rights claim, since even under strict scrutiny plaintiff's claim for excusal
from immunization requirements would fail), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 590 (2011).
89. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller
v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that plaintiffs could not combine "utterly
meritless" claims under a hybrid theory and obtain heightened scrutiny review).
90. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1999).
91. See Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs'
claims that their hybrid rights should be subject to strict scrutiny, noting the severe criticism the doctrine has
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In contrast to these circuits, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly rejected use of a more
rigorous standard for hybrid claims in a case involving Free Exercise and various
other First Amendment claims. 92 The Sixth Circuit has characterized the hybrid
approach as "completely illogical."93 It explained that it did "not see how a state
regulation would violate the [F]ree Exercise Clause if it implicates other
constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not
implicate other constitutional rights."94 The Second Circuit, following the Sixth
Circuit's lead, rejected a claim based on hybrid theory stating: "We too can think of
no good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of
constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated." 95 Moreover, the
Second Circuit contended that since Smith involved a single Free Exercise claim, the
Court's statements about hybrid actions were mere dicta.96 It stated: "[T]herefore, at
least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise
Clause vary depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will
not use a stricter legal standard to evaluate hybrid claims."97 The Third Circuit has
also concluded that it will not employ a hybrid theory to resolve religious
infringement claims. 98 Accordingly, when the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits are
faced with a neutral law of general applicability, they will decline to apply an elevated
level of scrutiny to hybrid rights claims and instead apply Smith's rational basis
standard.
There is a strong case to make that the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits have
gotten the better of the argument in the hybrid-claim debate. They have recognized
that Smith was a single issue Free Exercise case and that Smith's statements about
hybrid analysis were dicta. Moreover, Smith gives no guidance as to how to blend
these multiple sources of right. For example, does the primary Free Exercise claim
get more weight in the calculus of the blended hybrid claim? What does claim
"interdependence" mean within the First Circuit's analysis? What does it mean that
one claim "informs" the other?
Justice Souter made a cogent observation when he concluded that if a hybrid
right is one which implicates another right the Smith rule would become
meaningless. 00 This is because virtually all Free Exercise claims implicate another
received and declining to be the first circuit to allow a plaintiff "to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this
manner").
92. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding hybrid rights language in Smith is dicta), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); see also
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. ofVeterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
93. See Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 177.
94. Id.
95. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
96. Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
97. Leebaert, 332 F.3 at 144 (quoting Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180) (internal quotations omitted).
98. Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2008) (analyzing issue and
concluding that until the Supreme Court says otherwise, it will treat hybrid-rights theory to be dicta).
99. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144; Combs, 540 F.3d at 246-47; Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180; Watchtower
Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d at 560-62, rev'd on other grounds, 534 U.S. 971
(2002).
100. See discussion supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text.
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right, whether it be First Amendment associational or speech on the one hand, or due
process protections on the other hand, for example. Courts should discard hybrid-
claim analysis of religiously-based claims unless the Supreme Court directs
otherwise; each constitutional right should be assessed on its individual merit. 101
IV. SMITH'S INDIVIDUALIZED-EXEMPTION EXCEPTION
This Part considers the individualized-exemption exception to Smith mentioned
in Church of Lukumi, 102 whereby a religious adherent may state an actionable Free
Exercise claim against an agency when the agency makes available "individualized
exemptions from a general requirement [but refuses] to extend that system to cases
of religious hardship without a compelling reason."103
The Supreme Court has never explained what it meant in Church ofLukumi about
a system of individualized exceptions which would trigger heightened scrutiny, and
thereby impose a more searching review than Smith requires for neutral laws of
general applicability.104 However, it appears that the facts in Sherbert v. Verner10 5
may exemplify a system of the kind to which the Court referred.
It will be recalled that in Sherbert the Court held that the denial of benefits
violated the Free Exercise Clause because it "force[d] [Sherbert] to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand."1 06 Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits for failing to show "good
cause" for her unemployment. In Sherbert, the good cause determination was made
by an agency official who scrutinized an applicant's specific, personal circumstances,
that is, on a case-by-case basis. Since this process invited exemptions on other than
religious grounds, the State could not refuse to accept faith-based reasons on equal
footing with secular reasons for awards of unemployment compensation. 0 7 The
inference to be drawn from such language is that where unfettered discretion resides
in executive branch officials, opportunities for religious discrimination may arise and
raise constitutional concerns.
The process of ad hoc basis exemptions used in Sherbert fits neatly into the
construct of a system of individualized exemptions within the meaning of Smith and
Lukumi. This exception to Smith seems to be limited to cases where the system's
architecture is designed to uniformly require individualized determinations. Such
systems are distinguishable from statutes which exempt whole categories of persons
101. For discussion about hybrid claims in the post-Smith era, see, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of
Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 627, 631 (2003); Timothy J. Santoli, A Decade after Employment Division v. Smith: Examining
How Courts Are Still Grappling with the Hybrid Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 649 (2001).
102. See discussion supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
103. Church ofLukumi, 508 U.S. at 537 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
104. Id at 537 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
105. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Id. at 404.
107. The Smith Court stated: "where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not
refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 494 U.S. at 884.
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from rules of general applicability. For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that a
home-schooled student's Free Exercise rights were not violated by a rule that
enrollment in a public school's courses was limited to its full-time students,
notwithstanding the fact that the rule contained limited exceptions for fifth year
seniors and special education pupils. 08 The key distinction is that the built-in
exceptions were uniformly applied and did not entail individualized subjective
determinations of the kind eschewed in Smith and Lukumi.109
A thoughtfully constructed state religious liberty statute for kindergarten through
grade twelve ("K-12") education can help avoid the constitutional thicket resulting
from the individualized-exemption exceptions. It would create "whole categories" to
which exemptions apply and remove from education officials, broad discretionary
authority concerning religious exemptions. This approach is taken in Part VII, infra,
where the elements of a K-12 religious liberty statute are proposed. To inform that
discussion the next part recites a brief history of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Acts ("RFRAs") and suggests its implications for religion-based accommodations to
public education requirements.
V. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACTS
A. The Fate of Congressional Enactments in the Courts
1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Smith Court's prediction in 1990 about legislative activity in support of
religious adherentsI 0 was soon realized. Congress responded to Smith by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)."' RFRA declares that its
purpose is "(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder, . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim
or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government."1 2 The core of RFRA states:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except ...
[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
108. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 698-99, 701 (10th Cir. 1998).
109. Id. See also, Axton-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Mormon college
student who was refused an exemption in a classroom acting class when she refused to use profanity or take
God's name in vain, raised sufficient questions of fact to warrant a trial on whether a system of individualized
exemptions existed in the class, where other students were granted exemptions from course requirements on
religious grounds and where plaintiff herself previously had been granted exemptions); but see, Hicks v. Halifax
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 657 n.4 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (holding that a "limited financial hardship
exception to the [school's] uniform policy does not rise to the level of a 'system of individualized exemptions').
110. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).




furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 1 13
A person whose religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA "may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief."' 14
2. City ofBoerne v. Flores
As originally enacted, RFRA applied to states as well as the federal government.
In a 6-3 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,115 the Supreme Court held the
application of RFRA to states to be beyond Congress's legislative authority under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,11 6 and declared the Act unconstitutional.'" 7 In
writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that § 5 empowers Congress to
enact laws "to enforce" the amendment, but where Congress creates new
constitutional rights or expands the scope of those rights, it cannot be acting to
enforce that amendment."' Thus, the Court held that under § 5 Congress may act
only to prevent or remedy a violation of rights recognized by the courts. Moreover,
such laws must be narrowly tailored in that they must be proportionate and congruent
to prevent or remedy the constitutional violations."l 9 RFRA failed to meet these
requirements.120 Although City of Boerne thwarted Congress's efforts to limit the
effects of Smith on state and local governments, it did not address the constitutionality
of the RFRA as applied to the federal government. This is because § 5, as the rest of
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply to the federal government.
3. The Federal RFRA and Public Education
Despite City ofBoerne's declaring RFRA unconstitutional in 1997 as applied to
the states, decisions applying the RFRA are helpful in understanding the strengths
and pitfalls of the Act's structure and language, and improving upon same where
needed. This is especially true since state RFRAs are modeled on their federal
counterpart.
In Cheema v. Thompson,121 the Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction
against a school district and ordered it to accommodate three Sikh children in their
request to bring ceremonial knives to school. 122 A central tenet of the students'
religion required them to wear long hair, a comb, sacred underwear, a steel bracelet,
113. Id. §2000bb-l(a) and (b).
114. Id. §2000bb-l(c).
115. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
116. Section 5 states: "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article."
117. 521 U.S. at 512.
118. Id. at 519-20.
119. Id. at 533-34.
120. Id at 533-35.
121. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
122. Id. at 884, 886.
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and a ceremonial knife, known as a "kirpan."123 A kirpan's blade is made of steel and
curved; the knife is about six to seven inches long, with a blade of about three and
one-half inches long.124 Kirpans are worn in a sheath and held to the body with a
leather strap.125
In its defense to the RFRA claim, the school district relied on its policy which
banned all weapons, including knives, from school grounds, as well as two state
statutes which made it a crime to carry a knife with a blade longer than two and one-
half inches on school property and authorized expulsion for possession of any knife
of no reasonable use to the pupil on school property.126
In a prior appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that court had concluded that these Sikh
children showed enough hardship to warrant a preliminary injunction based on
irreparable injury, since they were excluded from school based on their religious
practice.127 Moreover, in their prior appeal, the court agreed with the parents that the
children's conduct was animated by a sincere religious belief, and the district's
refusal to accommodate them put a substantial burden on their exercise of religion.128
In the prior appeal the circuit court also agreed that the school district had a
compelling interest in campus safety and that the kirpan ban served that interest. 129
However, because the school district had failed to develop evidence of whether less
restrictive alternatives to a total ban existed, it remanded the case to the district court
for further findings on this issue. On the remand the parties were unable to agree on
an accommodation plan and the district court fashioned its own compromise and
entered an order implementing its decision. 130 The order allowed the children to
return to school wearing the kirpan with a dull blade that was about three to three and
one-half inches long with a total length of six and one-half to seven inches, including
its sheath.13 1 The kirpan had to be sewn tightly to its sheath and worn on a strap so
that it was not readily visible.132 A designated school official was permitted to make
reasonable inspections to confirm these conditions were satisfied.133 In its review,
the Ninth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard to the court's order and
found no abuse.134
123. Id. at 884.
124. Id. at n.1.
125. Id.
126. Id at 886.








134. Id Indeed, in what can only be characterized as an extremely critical view of the school district's
conduct, the circuit court observed: "We note that defendants' own conduct left the district court with no
thoughtful and careful advice as to how to accommodate student safety and yet respect the Sikhs' religious
practices and beliefs." Id at n.4. Though agreeing on the issue of a RFRA substantial burden, one judge on the
panel dissented from the majority's holding that the school had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. Id
at 889 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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In Battles v. Anne Arundel County Board ofEducation,135 a parent sought relief
from educational requirements under the federal RFRA. 136 The parent and child who
engaged in home schooling claimed that Maryland's system of monitoring home
education infringed on their right to free exercise of religion. 137 The parent's choice
to home-school her child stemmed from her belief that public schools indoctrinate
children in atheistic or anti-Christian world views, promote paganism and
evolutionism, and that the law's requirements for home schooling are designed to
suppress parents' religion. 138 Under Maryland's compulsory education law and home
education requirements, parents were allowed to give home education to children,
but the State retained a supervisory role. 139 The State required the child to receive
instruction in English, mathematics, science, social studies, art, music, health, and
physical education.140 Moreover, the State required the parent to maintain a portfolio
of instructional materials and examples of the child's work to show that the child is
receiving regular and thorough instruction in those areas. 141 The law directed the
parent to permit a representative to observe the teaching given and review the
portfolio at a mutually agreeable time and place, not more than three times a year.142
To ensure compliance with these regulations, a parent who educated her child at
home was mandated to sign a consent form indicating that she had read and
understood the regulations.143 Since Battles refused to sign the consent form, and
would not allow the local school system to monitor her daughter's education,
litigation ensued.
The court approached its analysis by incorporating into the RFRA the pre-Smith
standard of review, as the Act required. It posed as a threshold question whether
Battles' religious exercise was "substantially burdened." Citing to Sherbert v.
Verner,145 the Battles court stated that: "a 'substantial burden exists in the
Constitutional sense when governmental action compels a party to affirm a belief
they do not hold, discriminates against an individual or group because of religious
belief, inhibits the dissemination of particular religious views, or pressures a party to
forego religious practice." 46
The Battles court found the parent and her child were not required to alter their
religious beliefs, or forego acts necessary to comply with their beliefs, to satisfy
Maryland's monitoring requirements for homeschooling, and school districts were
not required to purge from their curriculum content which the parents found
135. 904 F.Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1995).
136. Id. at 473.
137. Id. at 472-73.
138. Id. at 477.
139. Id. at 472-73.
140. Id. at 473.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 476.
144. Id. at 473.
145. Id at 477 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
146. Id. at 476-77 (citing Sherbert 374 U.S. at 402-03).
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religiously objectionable. 147 Accordingly, the court dismissed the RFRA complaint
for the parent's failure to show a substantial religious burden without having to
consider the State's interest in refusing the accommodation. 148The Battles court read
the Sherbert test for a religious burden quite narrowly. Sherbert stated expressly that
religious burdens, for purposes of Free Exercise analysis, included the indirect results
of legislation. 149 Under Thomas v. Review Board,5 0 decided about eighteen years
after Sherbert and about fourteen years before Battles, the Supreme Court reiterated
Sherbert's advice that a state-mandated affirmance or denial of a religious belief is
not the only way that a religious adherent may establish a Free Exercise burden.15
Thomas reaffirmed Sherbert's teaching that a state cannot require a person to choose
between the benefits of a public program and a religious belief. Since Battles
complained that, among other things, the required curriculum diminished the
importance of Christian holidays, inhibited the dissemination of particular religious
views, or pressured her to forego religious practice,152 the legislation's effect was to
impede the observance of one or more religious practices. 153
Battles is a paradigmatic example of a court using a narrow definition of
substantial burden to dismiss a case. Battles' religious convictions were apparently
sincerely felt. Her articulated religious grounds for the exemption were concrete and
comprehensible. Although Battles' accommodation request was broad-based and
perhaps poorly articulated, aspects of it could readily be accommodated by narrow
tailoring, without obstructing the State's interest in achieving its educational goals.
The State's requirement of school officials entering the Battles' home and
observing the instruction, and its command that the parents maintain relatively
detailed records, burdened the parent's religious exercise, when simply requiring the
child to be tested on core curricular requirements at sensible intervals, like other
children presumably were, should have satisfied the State's interest. Battles illustrates
why broader and particularized statutory protections for religious rights are needed
if the mistakes of the past are not to be repeated. These remedies are addressed in
Part VII.
The court in Cheema v. Thompson,154 applied the federal RFRA as its drafters
intended. However, it took two Ninth Circuit reviews in Cheema to reach the correct
result, largely due to school officials' intransigence. Cheema is noteworthy in that it
is one of the rare occasions where a religious adherent prevailed against an
educational agency. Its exceptionality implies the legislators need to do more to
secure the rights they intended to protect. The result in Battles v. Anne Arundel
County Board of Education is far more typical in that it represents courts defeating
cases on threshold issues like the existence of a religious burden, thereby avoiding a
147. Id. at 477.
148. Id. at 477-78.
149. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
150. Thomas v. Review Bd of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
151. Id
152. Battles, 904 F.Supp. at 477.
153. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
154. See discussion supra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
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determination of the compelling nature of the governmental interest.155
4. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal
The question left open by City of Boerne as to RFRA's impact on the United
States was largely resolved in 2006 in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao Do Vegetal.15 6 In Gonzales, a religious sect brought a suit in which it sought
to preliminarily enjoin the United States from barring its use of a substance known
as hoasca, a tea containing a hallucinogen, in religious ceremonies.157 The United
States contended its authority for the ban derived from the Controlled Substances Act
("CSA").158 There, the Supreme Court, applying the RFRA, held in a unanimous 8-
0 vote that the government had the burden to show a compelling interest, and it failed
to meet that burden in barring the sect's sacramental use of hoasca.159
The Gonzales Court rejected the government's argument that the CSA could not
function properly if it was subjected to exceptions.160 The Court observed that RFRA
and its strict scrutiny mandate required "an inquiry more focused than the
Government's categorical approach" to CSA's prohibitions.16 ' In particular, the
Court emphasized that the RFRA's compelling interest test required examining the
application of the challenged law to the person, that is, the particular claimant whose
sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.162 The Court explained
that Sherbert's and Yoder's standards were expressly incorporated into RFRA.' 63
This required the Court to look beyond broadly formulated governmental interests in
justifying across-the-board burdens placed on religious exercises and the harms done
to the adherents.'" The Court noted that hoasca's listing in CSA as a forbidden
substance did not relieve the government of its obligation to satisfy RFRA
requirements.165 It observed that CSA itself authorized "the Attorney General to
'waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or
dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety,"' 66 suggesting
that Congress's findings with respect to CSA's Schedule I substances "should not
carry the determinative weight." 67 Moreover, the Court observed that Congress had
decreed an exception from CSA for the religious use of peyote by Native
Americans.168 Since Congress permitted such use by "hundreds of thousands of
Native Americans practicing their faith," such findings tended to undermine the
155. See discussion supra notes 154-178 and accompanying text.
156. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
157. Id. at 423.
158. Id. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 810 et seq. (West 2000).
159. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 422-23.
160. Id. at 430.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 430-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 431.
164. Id.
165. Id at 432.
166. Id. (internal citation omitted).
167. Id. at 432-33.
168. Id. at 433.
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government's contention that a similar exception could not apply in this case.169
Notably, the Gonzales Court referred to the then recent decision in Church ofLukumi
as establishing that under its strict scrutiny jurisprudence "a law cannot be regarded
as protecting an interest 'of the highest order'. . .when it leaves appreciable damage
to that supposedly vital [governmental] interest unprohibited."o70  Moreover, the
Court's reading of RFRA made clear that Congress conferred on the courts the
obligation "to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by
Congress."171
Importantly, Gonzales should not be interpreted too broadly. Its reach includes
protection from federal laws only. Since most state-religion disputes arise in local
venues, and certainly K-12 educational disputes are quintessentially local, its impact
on educational practice should be minimal. Nevertheless, Gonzales's construction
of the RFRA, particularly as to its criteria for satisfting narrow tailoring
requirements, should be helpful when designing state religious freedom statutes.
5. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")
The Supreme Court's City of Boerne decisionl 72 led to another Congressional
effort under the title Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA"). 7 RLUIPA requires the government to meet strict scrutiny standards
when it burdens religious exercise in two areas only: land use decisionsl 74 and
institutionalized persons. 175 Congress grounded RLUIPA's land use provisions in
the Commerce Clause, and its protection of institutionalized persons in the Spending
Clause, as a condition of receipt of federal funds. 176  Notably, the Act defines
religious conduct to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief."' 77
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson rejected a prisoner's claim
that the RLUIPA was facially unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause by
favoring religion.178  In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Cutter Court concluded that the government's accommodation of free exercise of
religion under the Act, did not reach Establishment Clause limits.' 79 Notably, Cutter
left open the question of whether RLUIPA exceeded congressional commerce or
169. Id.
170. Id at 433 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) quoting
Florida Star v. B.J., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)).
171. Id. at 434.
172. See discussion supra notes 146-160 and accompanying text.
173. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (West 2000).
174. Id. at § 2000cc(a)(1).
175. Id. at § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).
176. See id § 2000cc-1(b)(1) ("This section applies in any case in which ... the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.").
177. Id. at § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
178. 544 U.S. 709, 719-20, 725 (2005). The Cutter Court stated expressly that it was not reviewing Section
2 of the RLUIPA which applied to land-use regulation. Id at 716 n.3.
179. Id. at 719-24.
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spending powers. 80 Cutter's Commerce Clause and Spending Power questions
should not, however, pose any problems for the legislation proposed in Part VII,
infra, since only state statutes are involved. That said, Cutter doubles down on
Justice Scalia's open invitation for legislative action in Smith.'8 1  Although Cutter
leaves unanswered questions about the limits of federal power in protecting religious
exercise through the Commerce and Spending Clauses, it appears that Congress still
enjoys substantial power to legislate in this area.
B. Current Constitutional Landscape
Based on the previous discussion, the following conclusions may be drawn about
the complex statutory and constitutional relationship involving governmental
accommodations to religious exercise: (1) rational basis review under Smith will
control First Amendment Free Exercise challenges to state laws of general
applicability; (2) except under the RLUIPA, state actions which burden land use and
institutionalized persons will not be required to meet strict scrutiny standards; (3)
federal actions must satisfy strict scrutiny under the RFRA;182 (4) Congress is not
precluded under Cutter from exercising its Article I Section 8 Tax and Spending
powers to protect religious liberty in the states; (5) such legislation could lawfully
condition the States' participation in federal programs on compliance with Free
Exercise requirements, as defined in the law; (6) it is likely the Supreme Court would
not consider such conditioned spending to encroach on state prerogatives, since states
would enter into such agreements voluntarily with federal agencies.183 These
conclusions suggest that Congress still enjoys significant power in protecting
180. See id. at 715 n.2; but see id. at. 732-33 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the absence of a
Spending Clause challenge in the case, but suggesting that the legislation "may well exceed the spending
power."). For recent discussions of RLUIPA in land use cases, see generally, John Infranca, Institutional Free
Exercise and Religious Land Use, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693 (2013); Brian K. Mosley, Note, Zoning Religion
Out of the Public Square: Constitutional Avoidance and Conflicting Interpretations ofRLUIPA's Equal Terms
Provision, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (2013).
181. See discussion supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text.
182. Invocation of strict scrutiny standards under the RFRA for actions taken by the federal government
has produced mixed results. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Friend, Foe, Frenemy: The United States and
American Indian Religious Freedom, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 347 (2012) (criticizing the post-Smith responses to
Indian religious freedom where federal government officials make public land management-related decisions
and the federal courts' handling of claims related to Indian religious freedom).
183. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Dole created a four-part test to gauge the
constitutionality of individual conditional grants. Id. at 207-08. First, the condition must further the general
welfare, to which Congress's judgment in this regard receives substantial judicial deference. Id. at 207. Second,
the condition must be clearly and unambiguously stated. Id. Third, the condition must be germane to the
conditioned spending. Id. at 207-08. Fourth, there must be no "independent constitutional bar" to the condition.
Id. at 208. That is, "the [spending power] may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would
themselves be unconstitutional." Id. at 210. In light of the Court's sustaining religious freedom legislation as
against the United States in City of Boerne, and against the states in Cutter, it seems that despite some
uncertainty, such legislation would survive attack from federal and state objectors. That said, the extent to
which Congress exacted a price from the states for compliance with such legislation would play into the
analysis. This is evident from the so-called Obama-care legislation where, for the first time, the Supreme Court
held that Congress exceeded its Spending Clause powers by penalizing states for their refusal to participate in
a newly enacted national health care program. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2606-
07 (2012) (holding that Congress failed to give the states a genuine choice whether to accept federal money
because of the severe consequences to them by not doing so).
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religious exercise in the states, including actions by state educational agencies which
burden such exercise.
Each of the fifty states has a constitution which, to varying degrees, touches upon
religion. 184  These constitutions often contain more specific protection than the
United States Constitution's Religion Clauses. 1s Because they have sometimes been
interpreted to expand on religious liberty, relative to their counterpart in the United
States Constitution, state provisions have received increased scholarly attention in
the post-Smith era.18 6 Since state constitutional provisions have rarely been applied
to controversies involving religious accommodations from K-12 requirements, they
are excluded from the coverage of this article.
C. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
Professor Laycock has described church-state conflicts as perpetual, in which
religionists must prevail in every battle, at each governmental level, if their liberty is
to be preserved.187 Decisional outcomes in courts at every level of the judicial system
certainly support this assertion.188
184. See generally EDD DOERR & ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(1993); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113-230 (2009) (discussing
interpretation of state constitutional rights in the context of a federalist system).
185. The state provisions fall into categories: "Acknowledgement of God Provisions" which "express
gratitude to God, acknowledge God, or recognize humans as His creation;" "Religion Provisions" which contain
"bills of rights that broadly declare the freedom of religion and address the relationship between church and
state, those that prohibit the government from requiring those conscientiously opposed to bearing arms to serve
in the militia, and those that prescribe oaths for government actors that invoke God's help;" "Education
Provisions" which "prohibit the government from supporting any sectarian or denominational school with
money raised for the public schools, and those that prohibit instruction on any sectarian or denominational
doctrine in any public school;" and "Finance/Property Tax Provisions" which "includes those providing that
property used for religious or charitable purposes may be exempted from property taxation and prohibiting the
government from laying any tax or appropriating public money in aid of any church or private or sectarian
school." LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER, The Religious Liberty Archive,
http://www.churchstatelaw.com/stateconstitutions/index.asp (last visited on Apr. 8, 2012) (collecting states'
constitutional provisions).
186. See, e.g., Piero A. Tozzi, Whither Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and the Rebirth of
State Constitutional Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence?, 48 J. CATH. LEG. STuD. 269 (2009); Christine M.
Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitution Religion Clauses, 38
VAL. U. L. REV. 353 (2004); So Chun, Comment, A Decade After Smith: An Examination ofthe New York Court
ofAppeals' Stance on the Free Exercise ofReligion in Relation to Minnesota, Washington, and California, 63
ALB. L. REv. 1305 (2000); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993).
187. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV. 221, 229 (1993)
("Churches have to win these battles over and over, at every level of government. They have to avoid being
regulated by the Congress, by the state legislatures, by the county commissions, by the city councils, and by the
administrative agencies at each of these levels. Churches have to avoid being regulated this year and next year
and every year after that. If they lose even once in any forum, they have lost the war .... ).
188. See discussion infra notes 222-313 and accompanying text (addressing effectiveness of federal and
state RFRAs); see also discussion infra Part VI (providing overview of Supreme Court and United States Courts
of Appeal decisions in educational religious accommodation cases).
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1. Overview of State RFRAs
Sixteen states enacted mini-RFRAs through 2010.'9 In 2012, Kansas passed the
Preservation of Religious Freedom Act (KPRFA).' 90 And in 2013, Kentucky was
added to the list, when it enacted its version of the RFRA.191 Notably, major
population centers like California, New York, Ohio, and Michigan have not adopted
such measures. 192
Although state RFRAs represent efforts to return religious liberty to pre-Smith
levels under the Sherbert and Yoder tests, their standards for establishing religious
burdens are not uniform. Among those which have passed mini-RFRAs, at least
eleven require a showing of a "substantial burden" on religious exercise, 193 two
require a mere "burden,"1 94 and two mandate "restrictions on religious liberty,"195
before the state's interest is subject to strict scrutiny. Once the applicable burden is
189. See Lund, supra note 1, at 479. These states are: Arizona Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1493-1493.02 (2009); Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2009); Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-
05 (West 2010); Idaho Religious Freedom Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 73-401-404 (West 2009); Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 to /99 (West 2009); Missouri Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 1.302-307 (West 2010); New Mexico Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (West 2006); Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 251-258 (West 2010); Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, 71 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401-2407 (West 2009); Rhode Island Religious Freedom Restoration Act, R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 42-80.1-1 to -4 (West 2006); South Carolina Religious Freedom Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§1-32-
10 to -60 (2010); Tennessee Religious Freedom Amendment, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1101 (2009); Texas
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001-012 (Vernon 2009); Utah
Religious Land Use Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-5-101 to -403 (West 2008); Virginia Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 to 57-2.02 (West 2009). Alabama's state RFRA is embedded in its
state constitution, which makes its repeal much more difficult. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; See Thomas C.
Berg & Frank Myers, The Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment: An Interpretative Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV.
47, 56-58 (2001) (making this point). Utah's RFRA has been renamed the Utah Religious Land Use Act to
conform more closely to the statute's purposes. See Utah Code § 63L-5-101 (2010).
190. 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws (enacting HB 2203). Under the Act, a "substantial burden" triggers the
Act's requirements; it limits a governmetal "compelling interest" to those "interests of the highest order." See
id; see also Caroline M. Corbin, Animus and the Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, JURIST-
FORUM (Apr. 23, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04caroline-corbin-religious-freedom.php (observing the
similarity of the Kansas act to other state RFRAs in that it subjects to strict scrutiny any law which imposes a
substantial burden on religious practice, but that the law creates a special defense to municipal anti-
discrimination ordinances where, for example, a land lord will not rent to same sex couples).
191. Kentucky Religious Freedom Act, 2013 Ky. Acts _ (enacting HB 279); see also Don Byrd, KY
Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto of Religious Freedom Bill, Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Liberty (Mar. 28, 2013), bjcmobile.org/ky-legislature-overrides-governor-veto-of religious-freedom-bill!.;
Peter Smith, Religious- Liberty laws have had limited effect nationwide, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Mar. 19,
2013), blogs.courier-journal.com/faith/2013/03/19/religious-liberty-bill-is-no-slam-dunk-for-defiance/ (stating
that the bill "creates the right for someone motivated by 'a sincerely held religious belief' not to be
'substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to
further that interest."').
192. See Lund, supra note 1, at 479. For example, Lund observes that more than one in six Americans
lives in New York and California alone, where RFRA bills have failed. Id.
193. These are: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Lund, supra note 1, at 477.
194. Connecticut and Alabama fall into this category. Id.
195. Rhode Island and Missouri have set this threshold for actionable claims. Id.
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established, all RFRA states expressly require the government to show that the
burden furthers a compelling interest, and that the state has used the least restrictive
means to further that interest.196
Variances exist among the mini-RFRAs in other respects. These include:
whether money damages are available for violations of the Act,197 the availability of
attorney fee awards to prevailing parties,198 and procedural obstacles, such as a notice
of claim requirement as a condition precedent to suit. 199 Moreover, state RFRAs vary
in coverage exclusions. Exclusions are written into the statutes most often with
respect to persons incarcerated in state prisons, but these are not the only coverage
exclusions to mini-RFRAs. 200
Commentators have uniformly observed that mini-RFRAs have failed to achieve
their purpose in protecting religious liberty. Among the states that have enacted
RFRAs, four have never decided a case under the Act,201 and another six have
decided only one or two cases. 202 The two most recent enactments in Kansas and
Kentucky have not resulted in any reported cases. Moreover, in most jurisdictions
with state RFRAs, plaintiffs have not won a single case and, in jurisdictions where
victories occurred, they were indeed scarce.203 Of even greater concern is that courts
have routinely, and improperly, raised the threshold for showing a "substantial
burden" in state RFRA cases, thereby permitting courts to dismiss cases without
having to apply strict scrutiny to the government conduct being challenged.204 And,
where religious adherents' cases have initially survived, courts have typically applied
rational basis review to the government's conduct, in essence refusing to follow the
legislative command that it show a compelling interest.205 The great irony in all of
this is that the purported goal of these state enactments was to counter the adverse
effects of City ofBoerne and replace them with more religion friendly SherbertlYoder
or Gonzales style review.
196. See Lund, supra note 1, at 477-85. See also, e.g., Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act,
2012 Kan. Sess. Laws (enacting HB 2203); Kentucky Religious Freedom Act, 2013 Ky. Rev. Stat. Adv.
Legis. Serv. _ (West) Acts - (enacting HB 279).
197. The states which expressly permit the recovery of money damages are: New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Texas, see Lund, supra note 1, at 478 n.76, and Kansas, see Kansas Preservation of Religious
Freedom Act, 2012 Sess. Laws (enacting HB 2203). Two states forbid such recovery: Pennsylvania and
Virginia. See Lund, supra note 1, at 479 n.77.
198. Lund, supra note 1, at 478 n.73 (listing Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia as states in which fees and costs may be recovered); see also,
Kansas Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, 2012 Kan. Sess. Laws _ (allowing attorneys' fee awards).
The federal RFRA allows such recoveries. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West
2011).
199. Lund, supra note 1, at 490-91 (observing that three of the then sixteen extant state RFRAs contain
notice and exhaustion requirements and suggesting legal practice and fairness issues which may arise from their
enforcement).
200. Id. at 491-93 (reviewing state RFRA coverage exclusions).
201. Id. at 480.
202. Id. at 479-80.
203. Id at 481-82. Professor Lund points out that simple tallies of wins and losses do not tell the full story
since the merits of each case will obviously vary, but the fact that more than half of the jurisdictions with mini-
RFRAs have no litigated victories has some significance. Id at 482.
204. See id at 487-89.
205. See id at 485-87.
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James W. Wright, Jr. also has observed the minimal success enjoyed by religious
adherents under mini-RFRAs. 206 To understand these outcomes, Wright examined
the underlying legislative findings leading to the adoption of mini-RFRAs.207 He
observed "the noticeable discrepancy"208 among RFRAs in this respect.209 For
example, he points to seven states which have no legislative finding within their state
RFRAs, 210 and others "which . .. include a modest sentence outlining the purpose of
the Act."211 In contrast to these states, Wright points to two others which adopted
legislative findings which clearly amplify the RFRA's purpose, 212 and make it
evident the intent was to return to pre-Smith standards. 213 Wright points out the mere
fact of RFRA enactments and their uniform inclusion of a compelling interest test
makes the purpose of the Acts obvious. 214 That said, more definitive legislative
findings statements of purpose might have led to better outcomes for religious
adherents. Proposals to address these and other deficiencies are discussed in Part VII
infra.
Wright also observed that there is significant variation among the mini-RFRAs
in defining what a burden on religion is for purposes of activating strict scrutiny
analysis. 215 He shows that satisfying this threshold requirement has posed major
obstacles to those seeking religious accommodations, 216 and proposes legislative
reform focused on this aspect of statutory drafting.217
Wright's recommendation is to broaden the definition of what a religious burden
is by including a wide range of individually faith driven decisions resulting in conduct
or expressions and not merely those emanating from formally organized systems.218
Wright favors the definition of substantial burden contained in Pennsylvania's
RFRA.219 He contends its breadth most effectively limits judicial discretion 220 and
notes that "Pennsylvania's approach is correct." 221 Because Wright's proposal may
206. See James W. Wright, Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61
ALA. L. REv. 425, 435 (2010).
207. Id. at 430-32.
208. Id. at 431.
209. Id
210. These states are: Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas. Id.
at 431 & n.46.
211. Id. at 431. These states include Arizona and Pennsylvania. Id at n.47.
212. Id. at 431-32. These states include Illinois, South Carolina., and Alabama. Id. at 431 nn.48-49.
213. Id at 431-32.
214. Id. at 432 (arguing "the purpose of these acts is clear - to restore the compelling interest test struck
down in Smith and again in Boerne").
215. Id at 433-35.
216. See id at 433 (characterizing the problem of plaintiff proving a substantial burden as the most
substantial bar to a successful claim under state RFRAs); id at 438-44 (discussing the issue and illustrating the
consequences of legislative failure to define burdens on religion).
217. See id at 434. Wright observed that among the RFRAs he studied, eight failed to provide guidance
regarding the meaning of the statutory burden it created, and these were the states in which "plaintiffs are least
likely to mount a successful Free Exercise claim against government action." Id at 434.
218. See id at 442-44.
219. Id at 434.
220. See id.
221. Id at 434. The Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, 71 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401-2407,
states in relevant part:
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not be sufficient to overcome the difficulties religious adherents have experienced in
K-12 settings, this article argues for the creation of specific statutory entitlements for
religious exercise, drawn from disputes reaching federal appellate courts.See infra
Part VII. This should further narrow executive and judicial discretion in denying
religious accommodations.
Wright further observes a trend in the cases of applying Smith-type rational basis
standards to state laws of general applicability despite direction in the RFRAs to
apply a compelling state interest standard when religious burdens arise.222 In effect,
once the court determines the law is one of general applicability, it becomes a defense
to the suits brought under the state RFRA, perhaps a conclusive one. 223 Indeed, the
raison d'etre of state RFRAs was to reject Smith.224 Finally, judicial refusal to enforce
mini-RFRAs raises separation of power questions, as between state legislative
branches and the judicial departments, as well as about weaknesses in legislative
drafting, which demand answers.
2. State RFRA Litigation in Public Education
Since no state RFRA contains an exception for religious liberty exercised in
public K- 12 settings, it is somewhat surprising how infrequently state RFRAs have
been used by parents seeking accommodations from public education requirements.
The most significant case to arise under a state RFRA in the public education
context is A.A. ex rel Betenbaugh v. Needville Independent School District,225
decided by the Fifth Circuit in 2010.226 A.A. involved an enforcement proceeding
under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("TRFRA"). 227 That law stated:
(a) Subject to Subsection (b), a government agency may not substantially
burden a person's free exercise of religion. (b) Subsection (a) does not
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), an agency shall not substantially burden a
person's free exercise of religion, including any burden which results from a rule of general
applicability. (b) Exceptions. An agency may substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion
if the agency proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the burden is all of the following: (1)
In furtherance of a compelling interest of the agency. (2) The least restrictive means of furthering
the compelling interest.
Id § 2404 (emphasis added).The Pennsylvania RFPA states that a "substantial burden" arises where:
An agency []does any of the following: (1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression
mandated by a person's sincerely held religious beliefs. (2) Significantly curtails a person's ability
to express adherence to the person's religious faith. (3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to
engage in activities which are fundamental to the person's religion. (4) Compels conduct or
expression which violates a specific tenet of a person's religious faith. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2403.
Id. § 2403.
222. Wright, supra note 239, at 435-38 (reviewing judicial analyses and showing how Smith standards have
crept into the courts' rationales).
223. Id. at 438.
224. Id. Wright expresses particular concern over the fact that this creeping version of Smith standards has
occurred in states where the lion's share of state RFRA litigation has arisen. These states are Connecticut,
Florida, and Illinois. Id. at 435-38.
225. 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).
226. Id. at 248.
227. Id. at 257.
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apply if the government agency shows that the application of the burden
to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. (c) A
government agency that makes the demonstration required by Subsection
(b) is not required to separately prove that the remedy and penalty
provisions of the law, ordinance, rule, order, decision, practice, or other
exercise of governmental authority that imposes the substantial burden are
the least restrictive means to ensure compliance or to punish the failure to
comply. 228
In Betenbaugh, a Native American kindergarten student and his parents sued the
school district, alleging that an exemption granted from the district's grooming policy
was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the TRFRA. 229 The policy required
that "[b]oys' hair shall not cover any part of the ear or touch the top of the standard
collar in back."230 The rule was predicated on the school's interest in preventing
disruption, avoiding safety hazards, and promoting discipline through the school's
assertion of authority.231 A.A. maintained a "religious belief... that long hair is ...
an expression of his ancestry and heritage, [and] a sacred symbol of his life and
experience in this world, and that it should be cut only to mark major life events such
as the death of a loved one."232 In his request for an exemption, A.A. alleged that his
"hair had never been cut."233 In accommodating A.A.'s request the district offered
two options: A.A. could wear "a single 'tightly woven' braid tucked behind [his] shirt
or a bun on top of his head."234 A.A. deemed the offer insufficient.235
In analyzing the adequacy of the District's offer under the TRFRA, the Fifth
Circuit applied the four-part test under which the claimant must show:
(1) that the government's regulations burden the plaintiffs free exercise
of religion and (2) that the burden is substantial. If the plaintiff manages
that showing, the government can still prevail if it establishes that (3) its
regulations further a compelling governmental interest and (4) that the
regulations are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.236
This test places the burden of proving a substantial burden on the claimant and the
burden of establishing a compelling state interest on the government. 237
TRFRA defines "free exercise of religion" as "an act or refusal to act that is
228. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (West 1999).
229. See Betenbaugh, 611 F.3d. at 254-57.
230. Id. at 253.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 256.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 257.
235. See id.
236. Id. at 259. This test was announced by the Texas Supreme Court in Barr v. City ofSinton, 295 S.W.3d
287 (Tex. 2009). Id.
237. Betenbaugh, 611 F.3d. at at 259 n.29 (citing Barr, 295 S.W. 3d at 307).
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substantially motivated by sincere religious belief."238 In assessing the claimant's
religious beliefs, TRFRA directs that "it is not necessary to determine that the act or
refusal to act is motivated by a central part or central requirement of the person's
sincere religious belief."239 The court concluded that A.A. had a sincere religious
belief in wearing his hair visibly long such that the alternatives proposed by the
District would be inconsistent with that belief.240 This conclusion was supported by
the fact that the student and parents had consistently maintained that the student's
long hair was "not only an expression of his ancestry and heritage, but also a sacred
symbol of his life."241
In analyzing the "substantial burden" question under the TRFRA, the court
concluded that the interference must be one which "is real [versus] merely perceived,
and significant [versus] trivial."242 This requires a finding on "the degree to which a
person's religious conduct is curtailed and the resulting impact on his religious
expression," as "measured . . . from the person's perspective, not from the
government's."243 Following Barr v. City of Sinton,24 and its progeny, the
Betenbaugh court indicated that the substantial burden inquiry requires a "case-by-
case"245 and "fact-specific" 246 analysis, and must take into account personal
circumstances.247 It concluded that even when a restriction on religious conduct is
not completely prohibitive, it is still a substantial burden if "alternatives for the
religious exercise are severely restricted"248 and it "impacts religious expression to a
'significant' and 'real' degree."249 The court held the burden on A.A. was
significant.250
In continuing with its individual inquiry the Fifth Circuit observed that A.A.
could not visibly wear his hair long at a critical time in his young life.251 It also noted
the indirect burdens that resulted.252 The District's proposed accommodations would
make A.A. "stand out as someone subject to official stigma." 253 Moreover, if A.A.
refused to accept the District's offer, he would be exposed to punishment for violating
the school's policy.254 Finally, the reality was that A.A. was aware he was being
treated differently because of his religious beliefs, and the threat of adhering to his
238. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1 10.001(a)(1) (West 1999).
239. Id.
240. See Betenbaugh, 611 F.3d. at 262-63.
241. Id. at 261-63.
242. Id. at 264 (quoting Barr, 295 S.W. 3d at 301). The breadth of these criteria led the court to conclude
that these limitations "leave a broad range of things covered." Id. (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 301).
243. Id. at 264 (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 301) (internal quotations omitted).
244. 295 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2009).
245. Betenbaugh, 611 F.3d. at 264 (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 302).
246. Id. (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 302).
247. Id. (citing Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 308, and Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 590 n. 65 (5th Cir. 2009).
248. Id. at 265 (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 305).
249. Id. at 265 (quoting Barr, 295 S.W.3d at 301).
250. Id. at 265.
251. Id.





religious practice was his continuing to risk feelings of shame and resentment.255
The A.A. court next examined the District's duty to establish a compelling state
interest for the policy.256 It emphasized that in order to establish a compelling interest
under TRFRA, statements of general interests, standing alone, will be insufficient,257
and that the State's burden may be carried only by showing that the restriction on
religious liberty is justified "with respect to the 'particular practice 'at issue."258 This
standard requires the court to make a searching examination of the interest the State
wishes to promote and the impediment to those goals that would result from
recognizing the exemption sought by the religious adherent. 259 Thus, "general
platitudes" from the government will not suffice; it must show, with specific
evidence, how the religious practice jeopardizes its stated interests.260
Applying these criteria, the court concluded that the school's interests in teaching
hygiene, preventing disruption, and avoiding safety hazards were not compelling
interests that justified, under TRFRA, the burden on A.A.'s religious practice. 261
Indeed, A.A.'s hair was kept clean and it posed no cognizable safety concern. 262
Moreover, the court concluded that although "the wearing of long hair and
unconventional dress by most boys [could] be seen as an act of defiance-and a
rejection of authority," A.A.'s long hair was not an act of rebellion, but simply
adherence to his religious belief.263 In short, the district's justification for enforcing
its "accommodation" to A.A. was extremely thin and definitively rejected by the
court's majority.264
In Combs v. Homer Center SchoolDistrict,265 the court construed a parent's Free
Exercise claim under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act
(PRFPA).266 The issue in Combs involved oversight by a local school district of
home-schooling programs, as required by the state statute.267 It required minimum
numbers of days and hours of instruction in certain subjects and compelled parents
to submit a portfolio of teaching logs and the children's work product for review.268
255. Id.
256. Id. at 266-72.
257. Id. at 268.
258. Id. (quoting Barr v. City ofSinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 306 (Tex. 2009)) (emphasis added).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 268-69.
262. Id. at 268. The court also rejected the District's argument that avoidance of those occasions where
A.A. was mistaken for a girl triggered a compelling interest by the District to justify burdening this religious
practice. Id. at 269.
263. Id. at 271. The court further observed that the District had not shown that, since it permitted girls to
wear their hair visibly long, any safety concerns had arisen with respect to girls or that any gender confusion or
conflict arose where girls had chosen to wear their hair short. Id at 271-72.
264. Id. at 272. The absence of a compelling state interest made it unnecessary for the court to apply the
"narrowly tailored" provision of the TRFRA. Id. at 266 n.72. That rule demands that the substantial burden on
Free Exercise be removed. Id. at 266.
265. 468 F.Supp. 2d 738 (W.D. Pa. 2006), af'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Combs v.
Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
266. See Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, 71 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2401, 2407, n. 220.
267. See Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., 468 F.Supp. 2d 738, 739-40 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
268. Id
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Further, it mandated that the parents show adequate progress in the overall
program.269 Under the Act, the school district did not review educational content,
textbooks, curriculum, instructional materials, or methodology. 270 The plaintiffs
sought an exemption from the requirements on the ground that both the record
keeping and portfolio obligations violated their religious liberty under the PRFPA.271
The parents asserted that the Act compelled "conduct or expression" by requiring
them to submit the content and records of their children's progress to the school
district.272 On appeal, they claimed, this violated a "specific tenet" of their religion
that "education of their children, not merely religious education, is religion and is
assigned by God to the jurisdiction of the family."273
In applying the fourth substantial burden test contained in the statute ("Compels
conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of a person's religious faith" 274),
the court concluded the plaintiffs had failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that they suffered a substantial burden on their religious freedom and
dismissed their claim.275
On appeal, the Third Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims
and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 276 It vacated the district court's
order applying the PRFPA and remanded that claim to the district court with
instructions to in turn remand it to state court for disposition. 277 The Third Circuit
noted that no authoritative state court had interpreted the "compels conduct or
expression which violates a specific tenet of a person's religious faith" provision of
the statute. 278 Thus, the Combs court rejected the opportunity to recognize the
statute's apparently broad definition of religious burdens, 279 leaving unsettled the
reach of this provision.
Betenbaugh and Combs show how otherwise easily solved problems involving
religious exercise can result in litigation due to the failure of school officials to make
simple programmatic adjustments for religious interests. They also illustrate the need
for more effective legislative remedies to prevent such conflicts from arising in the
first instance.
269. See id at 746.
270. Id at 740.
271. Id at 753-61.
272. Id.
273. Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 252, 253 (3d Cir. 2008)(The legislative proposal in
Part Vn also requires that the parents establish an infringement on religious exercise by a preponderance of the
evidence.See infra at 73.
274. See Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., 468 F.Supp. 2d 738, 771 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
275. Id. at 771.
276. Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 252, 254 (3d Cir. 2008).
277. Id. at 254.
278. Id at 253-54.
279. See Wright, supra note 239, at 434-35 (ranking the Pennsylvania Act as one of the broadest in
recognizing religious burdens).
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VI. THE QUEST FOR RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION
REQUIREMENTS
Part A of this section briefly reviews the United States Supreme Court decisions
rendered in the K-12 religious accommodation arena. Part B illlustrates the broad
range of K-12 religious accommodation issues confronted by the United States
Courts of Appeal during the last half-century. Part C shows how K-12 religious
exercise conflicts break down by dispute category. Part D empirically examines the
decisional outcomes involving public K- 12 religious accommodation disputes during
the Sherbert and Smith eras in the circuits. It illustrates conclusively the extraordinary
difficulty religious adherents have had in getting relief in the circuit courts,
irrespective of when their claims were brought.
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
Conflicts between adherents seeking religious accommodations and educational
agencies that have reached the United States Supreme Court have included disputes
over compelled public school attendance,280 ages for required attendance, 281 and
prohibitions on teaching foreign languages in public or private schools. 282 They have
also included disputes concerning state sanctioned release time from compulsory
education to receive religious instruction on school grounds during regular school
hours,283 as well as release time during regular school hours to receive religious
instruction off-campus.284 Famously, they have included disputes over compelled
flag salutes and mandatory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 285 and parental
resistance to state immunization requirements as a condition of students attending
public school.286
280. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also
supra note 36 and accompanying text and infra note 341 and accompaning text.
281. See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also supra notes 23-45, 112, 163 and accompaning text
text and infra note 193 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra p. 34 and infra p. 54.
282. See Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(state law prohibiting education in language other than English
unconstitutionally interferes with the substantive due process right of parents to control the upbringing of their
children).
283. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (holding
that the use of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith to students compelled by the State to attend those schools, falls squarely under the ban of the First
Amendment).
284. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (approving off-campus release time as an accommodation
to the religious needs of the people observing). The Court observed in Zorach that the Establishment Clause
does not require [schools] "to be hostile to religion or throw [their] weight against efforts to widen the effective
scope of religious influence" and that schools "can close [their] doors or suspend [their] operations as to those
who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction. No more than that is undertaken here."
Id. at 314.
285. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (concluding that "compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on [school officials'] power and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment. . . to reserve from all official
control").
286. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-29 (1905) (holding that the State may adopt a program
of compulsory small pox immunization for inhabitants of a town, including school aged-children); Zucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (holding that the State may adopt a program of compulsory immunization for
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B. Decisions from the United States Courts ofAppeal Involving Constitutional
Claims
1. Categories of K-12 Religious Accommodation Claims
Religious adherents have challenged a public school's decision to deny academic
credit to released-time attendees where the courses in which the students enrolled
were "mainly denominational" in content.287 Others have challenged procedures
which place on public schools the burden of gathering a seminary's attendance slips
in satisfaction of state requirements. 288 Moreover, conflict has arisen where students
have contended that they have a right to meet on school premises for communal
prayer meetings immediately before the school day commenced. 289 Litigation has
ensued where a school refused to recognize an afterschool Bible club whose rules
guaranteed that its president, vice president, and choral leader be Christians because
the club's rules were inconsistent with the school's generally applicable
nondiscrimination policy.290
In-school disputes have included those over compelled flag salutes and recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance,291 and students' exposure to religiously objectionable
material. With respect to the latter, parents have sought religious exemptions from
studying a mandated elementary reading series,292 using home economics, history
school-aged children).
287. See Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1360-62 (10th Cir. 1981) (invalidating part of a release-time
program that awarded academic credit for some religious courses-but not for those found to be "mainly
denominational"-because the program unconstitutionally entangled the State in examining and monitoring the
religious content of courses; however, the State can require that release-time courses for which credit is granted
to fulfill certain secular criteria, and such requirement does not offend Establishment Clause strictures); see also
Moss v. Spartansburg Cnty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 609-11 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the public
school's policy of allowing academic credit for off-campus release-time religious instruction from accredited
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause, since it was neutrally administered and had the secular
purpose of accommodating students' desire to receive religious instruction).
288. See Lanner, 662 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding that First Amendment Establishment Clause requirements
were violated when the public school assumed the burden of gathering seminary attendance slips at private
religious school for released-time students, because there was a less entangling alternative of requiring released-
time personnel to transmit attendance reports to public school).
289. See Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of the Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding that students' Free Exercise rights were not limited by school board's refusal to permit communal
prayer meetings to occur on school premises, and that permitting such activity would have created an unlawful
establishment by linking the school to church activities).
290. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3,85 F.3d 839,868-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that exemption
of club from the school's generally applicable nondiscrimination policy would not constitute invidious
discrimination against non-believers under the Equal Protection Clause).
291. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2010)
(holding that students' exposure to recitation of Pledge of Allegiance neither violated students' nor parents'
ability to freely believe in atheism or agnosticism under Free Exercise Clause, nor their right to Equal Protection
of the laws). Every federal circuit court that has addressed a state pledge statute has rejected the claim of
unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2010); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch.
Dist., 597 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005); Sherman
v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Twp., 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992).
292. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting parents'
Free Exercise claim concerning grade 1-8 reading series which contained books purported to teach "higher order
cognitive skills" and discussed "'mental telepathy').
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and social studies textbooks, 293 and portions of a curriculum for first through sixth
graders based on the students' exposure to material contained in a reading series.294
Litigation has occurred as well over introduction into the first, second, and third grade
curricula material that seemed to endorse homosexual relationships. 295 Taxpayer-
parents have complained where the school district opened a school primarily attended
by a particular religious group and granted the attendees exemptions from use of
technology.296 Parents have even asserted infringements on their religious liberty
based on in-school Earth Day celebrations. 297 Prominent of course, has been the
spate of parents' religiously based litigation in the evolution versus creationism
conflict.298
Other curriculum disputes have arisen over mandated health education classes,299
293. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 827 F.2d 684, 692-93 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the use of home economics, history and social studies textbooks did not violate the Establishment
Clause by advancing secular humanism or by inhibiting theistic religion).
294. See, e.g., Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
claim that curriculum which asked children to discuss witches and create poetic chants and pretend they were
witches or sorcerers did not require children to practice "religion" of witchcraft in violation of Establishment
Clause); Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 683, 689-90, 695 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause claims that reading series indoctrinated children in anti-Christian
beliefs by teaching about "wizards, sorcerers, giants, and unspecified creatures with supernatural powers,
among other things").
295. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90, 105 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 56 (2008) (rejecting
claim of parents who objected to an elementary school's use of children's books which described families with
same-sex parents on ground that the school was trying to indoctrinate their children with the belief that
homosexual marriage is acceptable).
296. See Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068, 1075-77 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that neither
the opening of the school attended primarily by adherents of one particular religious group nor granting
exemptions from the use of technology violated Establishment Clause; because there was no endorsement of
religion, the school district did not delegate any control of educational system to adherents, and the exemptions
were uniformly granted to students whose parents requested them).
297. Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist. v. 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that celebration of Earth
Day did not violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses).
298. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1968 in Epperson v. State of Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), where it held that a statute which forbade the teaching of evolution was unconstitutional. Id. at 109.
Then, in 1987, the Court held that a Louisiana statute requiring balanced treatment of creation science and
evolutionary science was facially invalid as an establishment of religion. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
593-94 (1987). In Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rehearing
en banc denied, 201 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000), the Fifth Circuit held that a
disclaimer devised by the school board concerning the scientific theory ofevolution violated the Establishment
Clause on the ground that it had the primary effect of protecting and maintaining a particular religious viewpoint
and endorsing religion. Id. at 346-48.
299. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Free Exercise and Due Process and
"hybrid Free Exercise" claims by asserting that excusal from seventh-grade health education classes was not
constitutionally mandated. Id. at 142-43, 144-45).
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AIDS awareness and sex education,300 and compelled participation in ROTC.301 Still
other disputes have encompassed mandated community service requirements, with
no exceptions or opt-out provisions, as a graduation requirement. 302  Moreover,
litigation has ensued over a condom distribution program. 303 Such disputes have
included claims of Free Exercise infringement when a student was disciplined for
failing to follow pre-clearance procedures for valedictorian speech and giving a
speech with religious content. 304 Litigation has ensued over procedural rules that
require students enjoying a religious exemption to reapply annually for its
continuation. 305 Disputes have arisen over a music teacher's selection of explicitly
Christian music and Christian religious sites for performance. 306 Moreover, parents
300. See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184-185, n.26 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that parents'
Due Process rights "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children" was not
violated by school district's request that students complete a survey regarding their private lives, including
inquiries about drug and alcohol use and sexual activity, for use in planning community youth activities, even
if no parental consent for participation was sought); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist. (PSD), 427 F.3d 1197, 1207
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that although parents enjoy the right to control the upbringing of their children by
introducing them to matters of and relating to sex, that right does not extend beyond the threshold of the school
door to control in-school instruction in such matters); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525,
539 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) (rejecting claim students' compelled attandance at
sexually explicit AIDS awareness and sex education program was unconstitutional); Cornwell v. State Bd. of
Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), af d, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)
(rejecting parents' application to enjoin family life and sex education program in elementary and secondary
schools on First Amendment and Due Process grounds).
301. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that school district infringed on
"conscientiously object[ing]" student's Free Exercise rights by insisting that he complete an R.O.T.C. course to
satisfy the state physical education requirement and receive his diploma). The court in Spence noted that a less
burdensome alternative on student's religious beliefs was readily available, since the student could have readily
achieved the curricular requirement at a facility located less than one hundred yards from the student's school.
Id at 799.
302. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ. 89 F.3d 174, 179-80 (4th Cit. 1996)
(holding that the school district's mandatory community service program did not infringe on "parents' right to
direct the upbringing of their child"); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 463 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that school district's mandatory community service program did not violate parents' individual liberty
interest or student's right of privacy); Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 995-97 (3d Cir. 1993)
(rejecting claim that community service program violated student's rights since it compelled him to affirm a
philosophy of altruism, among other reasons).
303. See, e.g., Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d
260, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting parents' claim that voluntary high school condom distribution program
violated their "fundamental right to remain free from unncessary governmental interference with bringing up
their children").
304. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that student
was disciplined not for her religious views, but rather for failing to follow the religion-neutral policy, applicable
to school-sponsored graduation ceremonies, and for deceiving the principal concerning the content of the speech
she would give). In a non-student case, Carpenter v. Dillon Elementary Sch. Dist. 10, 149 F. App'x 645 (9th
Cir. 2005), the court dismissed a minister's claim asserting that the school district violated his First Amendment
rights "by granting and thereafter revoking permission" to speak at a school assembly. Id. at 646. The court held
that permission to speak at a school assembly was not a "valuable governmental benefit" and that therefore
revoking the offer did not violate the First Amendment. Id at 646-47.
305. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275,293-94 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
school's opt-out procedure, which mandated that parents annually apply for a religious exemption from school's
dress code policy by filling out a questionnaire designed to test the sincerity of their beliefs, did not burden
parents' Free Exercise and Establishment Clause rights).
306. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 556-58 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that, where student
member of school choir failed to allege facts showing that she was coerced into singing songs contrary to her
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have sought exemptions in such areas as vaccination requirements, 307 and dress and
grooming codes.308 Conflict has arisen as well in the wake of states enacting statutes
permitting home-schooling. 309 These disputes have been over such issues as the
obligation of parents who home-school their children to comply with reporting and
review requirements contained in compulsory education laws, 310 and the right of
home-schooled children to attend public school classes on a part-time basis.311 In the
charter school arena, parents have objected to a State policy that prohibited the use
of sectarian or denominational textbooks as part of the school curriculum.312 Disputes
have arisen about student-athletes' right to wear religious accoutrements during
interscholastic competition.313
In the private school arena, litigation has resulted over the extent to which public
schools were mandated to furnish educational services to students enrolled in private
religious beliefs, no Free Exercise cause of action was stated).
307. See, e.g., Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 F. App'x 815, 820 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
no Free Exercise violation occurred where superintendent, pursuant to regulation, asked parent to submit
documentation to support her request for an exemption,and that the regulation did not burden the Free Exercise
clause because it contained an express provision for religious exemptions to the immunization); McCarthy v.
Boozman, 212 F.Supp. 2d 945, 948-49 (W.D. Ark. 2002), vacated as moot sub nom. McCarthy v. Ozark Sch.
Dist., 359 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that appeals of lower court's decision, which held that religious
exemption to mandatory immunization program violated Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, where it
was limited to adherents and churches recognized by the state), vacated, 359 F.3d 1029, 1036-37 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding that appeal was moot after state legislature broadened exemptions "to encompass philosophical as well
as religious objections").
308. On dress codes, see, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a "parent did not have a fundamental right to exempt his child from the school dress code");
Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys Point Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 123 F. App'x 493 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting Equal
Protection claim of atheist mother who sought religious exemption from mandatory school uniform policy); see
also Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that school
regulation prohibting students from wearing rosaries as necklaces violated their Free Exercise rights because it
unduly burdened a "sincere expression of religious beliefs"). Chalifoux is a frequently cited case. On grooming
codes, see, e.g., A.A. ex rel Betenbaugh v. Needville Independent School District, 611 F.3d 248 (5" Cir.
2010)(granting religious exemption from school regulation of student's hair length).
309. All fifty state legislatures have enacted laws permitting some form of home-schooling, although they
vary widely in the rigor with which they direct supervision of the parents' educational activities. See generally
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Directing Children's Education: The Changing Views of Courts and Legislatures, 171
EDUC. L. REP. 381 (2003); CHRISTINE M. FIELD, A FIELD GUIDE TO HOME SCHOOLING (1998).
310. See, e.g., Murphy v. State of Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding State's use
of achievement tests to monitor progress of home-schooled children of compulsory education age as against
Free Exercise, Due Process, and Equal Protection challenges, despite the fact that such monitoring was not
mandated for students who attended more formal and structured private schools); see also supra notes 265-279
and accompanying discussion.
311. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 697-700, 702 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that school
district's policy, requiring students to enroll on a fill-time basis, did not unconstitutionally burden parents' right
to direct their children's education or the home-schooled student's Free Exercise rights when she sought to
enroll in foreign language, vocal music, and some science classes).
312. Nampa Classical Acad. v. Goesling, 447 F. App'x. 776 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting parents' claim,
concluding that the Establishment Clause "generally prohibits governmental promotion of religion, not
governmental efforts to ensure that government entities, or private parties receiving government funds, use
public money for secular purposes").
313. Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1034-36 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that athletic
association's rule forbidding basketball players to wear hats or other headwear, with sole exception of headband
no wider than two inches, while playing, did not violate Free Exercise Clause, but ordering the district court to
retain jurisdiction so that complaining players could have opportunity to propose to athletic association a form
of headcovering that complied with Jewish law, yet met association's safety concerns).
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religious schools. 314 Litigation has also occurred when public school employees have
suffered adverse employment decisions by enrolling their children in religious
schools rather than in the district in which they worked,315 or for electing to home-
school them.316
2. K-12 Court of Appeals Decisions and Defining "Religious Burdens"
Demonstrating a religious burden in constitutional cases is of paramount
importance, since it is the gatekeeper for such claims. A failure to demonstrate a
sufficient burden will doom the claim from the start.
The Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits define "substantial burden" as one that
either compels the religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion forbids or
forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires. 317 The Eighth and Tenth
Circuits use a broader definition- -: action that forces religious adherents "to refrain
from religiously motivated conduct,"318  or that "significantly inhibit[s] or
constrain[s] conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's]
individual beliefs,"319 or imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the
314. See, e.g., Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004). Gary S. examined parents'
claim that the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) violated their Free Exercise rights
because it furnished fewer services to their disabled son, who attended a Catholic elementary school, than he
would have received if he attended a public school in their school district. See id. at 17. The court concluded
"that no cognizable burden on religion has been caused by the federal government's failure to provide to
disabled children attending Catholic schools the same benefits as it provides to disabled public school children
...... Id. at 21. It anchored this conclusion on the proposition that "the mere non-funding of private secular
and religious programs does not 'burden' a person's religion or the free exercise thereof." Id. at 21-22. The
court observed: "[I]t is clear there is no federal constitutional requirement that private schools be permitted to
share with public schools in state largesse on an equal basis." Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted). In Goodall by
Goodhall v. Stafford Co. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1995), the court rejected a Free Exercise claim
similar to the one in Gary S. There the court said the State did not have to furnish a "cued speech transliterator"
to a deaf child, despite the parties' stipulation that the child needed the service to benefit from instruction. Id.
315. See, e.g., Barrett v. Steubenville City Sch., 388 F.3d 967, 971-72 (6th Cir. 2004)(holding that
elementary school teacher stated a claim under § 1983 for alleged violations by superintendent of his
constitutional right to rear his child by alleging that superintendent not only conditioned his full-time
employment on where teacher's son attended school, but also terminated him once his son was removed from
public school).; see also, Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., 332 F.3d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that a teacher, who was not considered for an assistant principal's position because she refused to re-enroll her
children in public school, stated a claim for violation of her constitutional right to educate her children in private
school).
316. See, e.g., Peterson v. Minidoka Cnty. Local Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, 1358-60 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by, 132 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a school superintendent's order to reassign an
elementary school principal to an elementary teaching position because the principal decided to home-school
his children was a violation of his free exercise of religion and liberty interests).
317. See Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir.1995); Cheffer v.
Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir.1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). See
Goodall v. Stafford Cnty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995);
Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding that since plaintiffs failed to allege their religion
required them to use physical force or threats of physical force or to obstruct clinic entrances to prevent
abortions, the federal Access Act did not violate RFRA) .
318. Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir.1994) Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994)
(quoting United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404,407 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989)).
319. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995).
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individual's religion. 320 The Sixth Circuit asks whether the law compels
"affirma[nce] or denial of a religious belief, or the performance or non-performance
of a religious exercise or practice." 321 If it does not, then no burden has been
established.322
C. Conflict Categories
To observe these religious freedom issues from the perspective of a wide lens,
this Article has grouped these decisions into seven categories derived from the sixty-
two K-12 religious accommodation decisions issued by United States Courts of
Appeal between 1963 (the date of the Sherbert decision) and 2013 which appear in
the Westlaw data base as indexed or published decisions. A letter designation has
been assigned to each category along with a description of the kinds of disputes
assigned to that category, the number of such disputes that were adjudicated, and the
percent of the database represented by that category of dispute. Where a dispute fell
into more than one category, I selected the one which came closest to the core issue
the case. Table 1 displays the results.323
Table 1: Distribution of United States Courts ofAppeal K-12 Religious
Accommodation Decisions between 1963-2013 by Conflict Category
Category Category Description N % of
Designation Decisions
A Student religious group meetings, group 5 8.1%
membership, and communal prayer.
B Opt-out or strike objectionable curriculum 33 53.2%
or school activities, including holiday
displays/songs.
C Student dress. 5 8.1%
D Scheduling of classes or events/holiday 2 3.2%
absences/release time.
E Student Health and Safety 5 8.1%
320. Id.
321. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987).
322. See id; see also Wallace by and through Wallace v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 1 F.3d 1243 (6th Cir.
1993) (unpublished opinion).
323. The conflict categories contained in Table I were substantially derived from those used by Professor
Berg. See Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 531, 549-72 (1999).
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These conflict areas will be examined more closely below,
discussion about legislative reform and conflict avoidance. 324
especially in the
D. Empirical Analysis ofDecisional Outcomes
Table 2 shows the outcomes for United States Courts of Appeals decisions issued
between 1963 and 2013 in which parents sought accommodations on constitutional
grounds from state education or local agency requirements.325
Table 2: Decisional Outcomes for Plaintiffs on Religious Accommodation
Claims in K-12 Educational Settings in United States Courts ofAppeal during
Sherbert v. Verner (1963-1990) and Employment Division v. Smith (1990-
2013) Eras
Case Type Sherbert v. Verner Era Employment Division Total
v. Smith Era
Won Lost Won Lost
Free 2 19 2 24 47
Exercise
Due 0 4 3 15 22
Process
Equal 0 8 1 13 22
Protection
Hybrid 0 0 0 7 7
Total 2 31 6 59 98
324. See discussion infra Part VH.B
325. State appellate decisions are not included in this analysis because they are relatively rare and state
courts tend to be influenced strongly by circuit court decisions.
F Private or Home School's Curriculum or 3 4.8%
Teacher Qualifications/student evaluation.
G Denial of educational benefits, including 6 9.7%
financial support to private school or its
students, or under home-schooling
program, or permission to participate in
interscholastic sports.
H Retaliation or unconstitutional conditions 2 3.2%
in public employment.




Table 2 reveals that, on all claims (Free Exercise, Due Process, Equal Protection
or hybrid theories) during the Sherbert era, parents prevailed on only two claims
while losing on thirty-one.326 This means that on all claims during that time period
plaintiffs prevailed about 6.1 % of the time. Further, during the Sherbert era, Free
Exercise claimants prevailed about 9.5% of the time. During this period no Due
Process, Equal Protection or hybrid religious liberty claimant prevailed on any claim.
On all claims during the Smith era, parents prevailed on six claims, while losing
on fifty-nine. Therefore, these claimants prevailed only about 9.2 % of the time.
During the Smith era, Free Exercise and Due Process claimants each succeeded only
about 7.7 % of the time. During the Smith era, Equal Protection claimants succeeded
in 7.1 % of their efforts. No hybrid claimant succeeded against school districts during
the Smith era. When the Sherbert and Smith outcomes are combined, claimants
succeeded on eight of ninety-eight claims or 8.2% of their claims.
A 2 (won-lost) x 2 (Sherbert v. Verner/Employment Division v. Smith era) test
of independence was performed to determine whether plaintiffs' success rate on all
claims during the Sherbert era differed from the claims made during the Smith era.327
This difference was not statistically significant.328 Similarly, no statistical difference
in success rates was found between the Sherbert and Smith eras for Free Exercise
claims.329 Although the differences in success frequency between for the two eras for
the Due Processand Equal Protectionare not meaningful in any practical way, their
statistical significance could not be formally calculated.330 331 Due Process,332 or
Equal Protection333 claims.
This data reveals, unequivocally, that Congress and the eighteen states so far
having adopted RFRAs were mistaken when they incorporated Sherbert and Yoder
standards into their enactments because they were doomed to fail, at least if the school
case outcomes can be generalized to other settings. Indeed, there is every indication
that they can. This is evident from the work done by James E. Ryan in the early
326. These outcomes do not equal the number of decisions in the Appendix because the courts decided
multiple claims in the same case. See infra pp. 79-82.
327. A test of independence is a hypothesis-testing procedure that examines whether the distribution of
frequencies over the categories of one nominal variable are unrelated to the distribution of frequencies over the
categories of another nominal variable. By convention a difference is considered significant if the probability
of the observed difference in frequency is less than or equal to.05, This is stated as p<.05.See generally ARTHUR
ARON & ELAINE N. ARON, STATISTICS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 507-42 (Leah Jewell et al. 3d ed. 2003). A nominal
variable is one with values which are names rather than numbers. Id. at 4.
328. A Fisher's exact test of independence [p=.714] revealed no relationship between era and decisional
status.
329. A Fisher's exact test of independence [p=.382] revealed no relationship between era and decisional
outcome for Free Exercise claims.X-- 0.880, df= 1, p. > .05.
330. This is because the Fisher's statistic requires that each cell in the calculation contain an integer between
one and five hundred.
331. e0.880,df-l,p.>.05.
332. ) 2 = 0.146, df-l, p.> .05.
333. X-0.823, df -1, p. > .05.
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1990s,334 and Professor Lund335 and Wright 3 discussed above.337
In 1992 Professor Ryan asserted that, despite the uproar over the Supreme
Court's Smith decision and the enactment of a legislative remedy to overcome Smith,
things would be unlikely to change much to advance religious liberty.338 He did this
by examining the ninety-seven federal appellate decisions involving Free Exercise
claims issued in the ten-year period immediately preceding Smith. 339 His study
revealed that only one or two federal appellate decisions would have turned out
differently under Smith than they did under the Sherbert test.34 0 This led Ryan to
predict that legislative efforts to restore Free Exercise rights to the Sherbert standard
would be ineffective in achieving the goals religionists and their supporters sought.341
In the twenty-plus year since Ryan wrote his article, his insights have turned out to
be prescient.
This study is both narrower and broader than Ryan's. It is narrower in that it
includes only cases involving K-12 public education disputes reaching federal
appellate courts, while his study examined claims from every walk of governmental
activity. Although the focus in this study may limit the generality of its conclusions,
it has the advantage of narrowing the discussion and developing a meaningful
understanding of the issues that arise in this highly regulated area of state control.
Moreover, unlike most religious liberty disputes, claims arising in public education
implicate both Free Exerciseand parental Due Process interests, 342 although in earlier
cases of this type the Supreme Court evaluated such claims solely based on the
parents' Due Process interest in controlling the upbringing of their child.343 This
alone warrants separate treatment. This study is broader than Ryan's in that it covers
about an eighteen-year period preceding Smith, whereas Ryan's covered a ten-year
period.34 Moreover, this study examines decisions issued during the Smith era, from
1990 through 2013, a database unavailable to Professor Ryan when he wrote his
article.
Three conclusions seem inescapable: (1) by RFRAs directing judges to apply
Sherbert standards, legislatures selected criteria which had unequivocally failed to
promote religious liberty during the preceding thirty years; (2) this virtually
guaranteed RFRAs' failure going forward; and (3) neither the original nor later
federal legislative enactments, or their state counterparts, have succeeded in
achieving the RFRAs' legislative goal of expanding religious liberty.
334. Ryan, supra note 13.
335. See discussion supra notes 220-248 and accompanying text.
336. See discussion supra notes 248-260 and accompanying text.
337. See discussion supra notes 220-260 and accompanying text.
338. Ryan, supra note 13, at 1413-17, 1439-41, 1445-49.
339. See id at 1416-34.
340. See id at 1414, 1433-34.
341. See id. at 1437-41.
342. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,218 (1972). Recall that the Court in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) treated Yoder as a hybrid case in which Free Exercise and Due Process interests
joined to sustain the result. See supra text accompanying notes 23-45.
343. See, e.g., Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
& Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
344. See Ryan, supra note 13, at 1412.
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Although there is probably little which can be done about influencing
constitutional interpretation at the United States and State Supreme Court levels, the
scholarly research discussed above and the current investigation have much to say
about how to draft K-12 religious freedom statutes if they are to become effective
tools for preserving religious liberty. How these lessons might be applied is taken up
in the next Part.
VII. ELEMENTS OF A MODEL STATUTE
A. General Considerations in Drafting a Model Statute
Although the legislative reaction to the Supreme Court's Smith decision was
intense,345 it should not have taken accommodations advocates by surprise. This is
because, during the decade leading up to Smith, there were many signs that the
Supreme Court would avoid applying Sherbert strict scrutiny to religious
accommodation disputes. 346  This trend, culminating in Smith, moved the Free
Exercise Clause from being the protector of individual religious conscience and the
autonomy of religious groups from state intrusions to being the protector of mere
neutrality.347 The losses suffered by religious advocates were attributable to the fact
that plaintiffs had, in the Courts' view, failed to "press[] a serious enough religious
interest," failed to show "a substantial enough burden on their religious exercise," or
345. See discussion supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (federal RFRA) and notes 220-238 and
accompanying text (state RFRAs).
346. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,259,261-262 (1982) (denying a free exercise exemption
from social security taxes for Amish employer on the ground that "maintaining a sound tax system was of such
a high order" as to overcome religious objections to paying the tax); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986) (holding that a military officer does not have a free exercise right to wear his yarmulke while on duty,
since requirements for military discipline and uniformity outweigh any countervailing religious interests);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native American parent's free exercise claim that requiring his
child to obtain a social security number would impair her spiritual development until she reached age sixteen);
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabzz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (dismissing free exercise claim of Islamic prisoners precluded
from engaging in collective Friday worship on ground that, in light of the state's penological interest, a special
burden should not be placed on prison officials to prove that no reasonable method existed to accommodate
prisoners' religious practices, and that prison officals acted in a reasonable manner); Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Prot. Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that, while government's actions will interfere with their
religious practice, constructing a road through a section of National Forest that has traditionally been regarded
as sacred area by three American Indian tribes does not violate the tribes' free exercise rights); Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (holding that the levy of a state sales and
use tax on the distribution of religious materials is not a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion, and that
the tax did not place a substantial burden on the freedom of the organization to practice its ministry).
347. See WrrrE & NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 158 (arguing that during the 1980s the Supreme Court "had
written out of the Free Exercise Clause the multiple principles that had informed the Court's earlier free exercise
opinions"-such as its solicitude for liberty of conscience and equality of religious faiths-and blunted its
previously nuanced interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause by converting it to one of "simple neturality").
Professors Witte and Nichols suggest that the failure to discern the erosion of Sherbert v. Verner standards in
the decade preceding Smith might be understandable since, in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court issued two
decisions, Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(upholding exemption of religious school from civil rights statutes prohibiting religious discrimination in
employment where employee had lapsed from his faith), and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the state's denial of unemployment benefits to claimant
who refused to accept job that might require him to work on Sundays), in which cases the Court continued to
apply the strict scrutiny standards introduced in Sherbert. id at 159.
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failed to establish "that their interest outweigh[ed] the government's." 348
Religionists' claim failures derived principally from the application of two
analytic frameworks: (1) judicial balancing of the constitutional claim against the
governmental interest at stake, often measured by the centrality of the governmental
power that is threatened, and (2) applying the three familiar standards of review used
in civil rights litigation, that is, rational basis low-level scrutiny, 349 heightened-
intermediate scrutiny,350 or high-level strict scrutiny,351 in assessing the claim's
merit.
Given the limited constitutional remedies available to plaintiffs in Smith's wake,
statutory remedies emerged as the balm of choice. 352  There is great irony in the
course of religious liberty during the last half-century: the Free Exercise Clause now
offers the "least promising pathway to relief' 3 since those claims benefit from the
lowest scrutiny available in the constitutional continuum. 354
Each of the eighteen state RFRAs contain weaknesses derived from the federal
RFRA, which must be overcome to create an effective statute protecting religious
liberty in educational settings. These deficiencies have enabled courts to
countermand what history and state legislative intent show to be the goal of protecting
religious exercise from government infringement. 35 5 The two principal ways in
which courts have created obstacles to attainment of these legislative goals are: (1)
defining government action which substantially burdens religious exercise so
348. See id. at 133; see also Daniel Kazhdan, Comment, How Jewish Laws ofResistance Can Aid Religious
Freedom Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1069 (2012) (arguing that courts do not sufficiently consider the perspective
of the burdened religion in First Amendment, RFRA, and the RLUIPA claims and recommending criteria to
assess the severity of the burden). Notably, the cases cited throughout this article rarely reached the issue of
narrow tailoring. But see supra pp. 26-28(discussing Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)(and supra pp. 22-23 (discussing Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th
Cir. 1995).
349. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding a federal criminal statute
crimininalizing polygamy, and dismissing the prisoner's free exercise claim that the statute violated his Mormon
religious beliefs by asserting that, while beliefs could not be regulated, actions could); Emp't. Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to Native American
claimants discharged for sacramental use of the proscribed drug, peyote, did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause).
350. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(holding that ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors and canvassers to obtain a permit containing one's
name violates First Amendment Free Speech and Free Exercise rights in light of ordinance's breadth and
government's failure to narrowly tailor the ordinance to its stated interest in preventing fraud, crime, and privacy
invasion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that city licensing law, which required
religious groups to procure a license to solicit in advance, but giving broad discretion to local administrators to
deny such licenses, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
351. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state's denial of unemployment
compensation to claimant discharged from job for refusing to work on the Sabbath violates the Free Exercise
Clause); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that RLUIPA, which applies strict scrutiny in land
use and prisoner cases, does not violate the Establishment Clause).
352. See WITrE & NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 160-62; see also id. at 163 (lamenting the Supreme Court's
narrowing of Free Exercise rights as contrary to its root principles of "liberty of conscience, freedom of religious
expression, and religious equality and pluralism," and arguing that, until the Court reverses course, "further free
speech and statutory protections of religious liberty must be vigilantly pursued in the short term").
353. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
354. Id.
355. See Wright, supra note 206, at 444.
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narrowly that many plaintiffs with valid claims are denied relief356 and (2)
incorporating elements of Smith neutrality, despite the fact that RFRA's were
intended to overcome Smith's holding.357
Any legislative solution must address each of these features by curtailing
executive and judicial power and particularizing parental rights in educational
settings so that school officials know with relative certainty what religiously-based
conduct is protected and what conduct is proscribed.
B. Elements of the Statute
1. Naming the Statute
Naming the statute "The Right to Religious Accommodations Education Act" or
"The Religious Freedom in Education Act," or a similar title, would send a signal to
educators and the judiciary that lawmakers are especially concerned with religious
liberty in educational settings. If the overwhelming number of losses suffered by
plaintiffs in K-12 religious accommodation disputes is due in part to legislatures'
failing to signal their special concern with this area of governmental functioning,
renaming the statute would move the focus from the general to the specific and
encourage the executive and judicial branches to take the Act more seriously than
they have under RFRAs.
2. Statement of Legislative Findings and Purpose
(a) Legislative Findings
Among its findings, the legislatures should state that: (1) prior RFRAs have been
unsuccessful in adequately protecting students and parents from burdens on their
religious exercise in K-12 education in public, private secular, private nonsecular,
and home-schooling settings; (2) laws and governmental actions which are facially
neutral toward religion, as well as laws and governmental actions intended to
interfere with religious exercise, have frequently unduly burdened the free exercise
of religion by parents and children interfacing with K- 12 public educational agencies;
(3) the narrow construction courts have given to religious burdens and the broad
construction they have given to the state interests to justify regulating conduct which
burdens religious exercise in K-12 educational settings are expressly rejected; (4)
there is a need to lift the undue burdens on religious liberty confronted by students
and their parents in K-12 educational settings and ensure that such liberty will be
protected; and (5) there is a need to reduce ambiguities embodied in general religious
liberty enactments, such as the RFRAs, and make more concrete what rights it intends
to protect in K-12 educational settings.358
356. Id. at 433-35 (showing how the "substantial burden" test is the most serious obstacle to plaintiffs'
success under state RFRAs).
357. Id. at 435-38 (illustrating how, over time, state courts have applied Smith's neutrality principles
"through the back door," despite clearly expressed legislative intent to reject the Smith standard).
358. The language in this paragraph is intended to overcome the paucity of findings typically found in state
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(b) Legislative Purpose
A statement should be made that the purpose of the Act is to: (1) ensure
accommodation of religious exercise in public, private secular and nonsecular
schools, and bome-schooling settings when agencies implement public education
requirements; (2) expand in K-12 settings, mandated religious accommodations
given to religious adherents in K-12 educational settings beyond current federal and
state constitutional and statutory minima; (3) recognize in K-I 2 educational settings,
genuinely felt acts of religious conscience in K- 12 educational settings which do not
fall within institutional religious practice; 359 (4) define protected religious conduct
within K- 12 educational settings to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief;" 360 and (5) require that all
laws the legislature has heretofore enacted or will hereafter enact which impact
religious exercise in K-12 educational settings be construed so as to avoid the
imposition of burdens upon the free exercise of religion as established by the Act,
absent compelling health and safety justifications, or unless otherwise permitted
under the Act.36 '
Although the statute could still require "sincerely held religious beliefs" as a
threshold requirement for an accommodation, the burden of proving this would only
be by a preponderance of the evidence.362
3. Applicability of the Act
(a) General rule
The Act should state that it would apply to any "State or local law or ordinance
and the implementation of that law or ordinance," affecting directly or indirectly K-
12 education. It would state that:363 "Any law enacted by the [legislature] after the
effective date of this [A]ct" would be made "subject to this [A]ct unless the
[legislature] expressly excludes that law from the Act's coverage "by specific
RFRAs and make clear what is often only implied in these laws. See Wright, supra note 239, at 431-32
(discussing this problem).
359. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 (stating that it is
not the role of the judiciary to determine whether a claimant's beliefs are consistent with the system of any
religious denomination).
360. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), 42
U.S.C. §2000cc (West) (2000).
361. This provision is intended to narrow judicial discretion in finding compelling educational justification
for imposing religious burdens while allowing such exceptions as are contained in the Act.
362. This threshold showing has not usually posed a problem for religious adherents. See, e.g., Wis. v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Emp't. Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); but
see, Friedman v. Clarkstown Cen, Sch. Dist., 75 F. App'x 815, 818-19 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that because
parent failed to show the relevant nexus between her religious beliefs and immunization, her son was not entitled
to the exemption the statute afforded). See also, Caroline L. Kraus, Note, Religious Exemptions-the
Applicability to Vegetarian Beliefs, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 197, 215-17 (2001) (stating that among the kinds of
evidence relevant to a sincerity determination are: (1) whether a person acted inconsistently with his claimed
belief;, (2) whether a person "materially gained" by masking a secular belief; "with a religious veneer", and
(3) whether the asserted beliefs are connected to "the religion's history and size and historical existence.").
363. See 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2406 (West 2002). This language is typical of state RFRAs.
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reference to this [A]ct."364 The Act would also apply to non-governmental agencies
performing educational functions for educational agencies when such entities are
acting under color of state law. 365 Under the Act "[a]n individual or a church,
association of churches or other religious order, body or institution which qualifies
for exemption from taxation under section 501(c)(3) or (d) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986" or any successor thereof would be protected from encroachments on
their religious liberty as defined by the Act. 366
(b) Exceptions
Despite the requirements contained in the immediately preceding paragraph (a),
the Act would not apply to any of the following: (1) any criminal offense involving
the illegal use of a controlled substance or drug on school premises which is graded
as a felony or a misdemeanor; 367 ( (2) any provision of the applicable motor vehicle
laws which does any of the following: (a) requires the licensing of school motor
vehicle operators in K-12 educational settings, (b) requires the registration or
inspection of motor vehicles used in the transportation of students in K-12
educational settings, (c) "requires financial responsibility for motor vehicle
accidents," including any minimum liability coverage under the applicable state law,
(d) "protects the public from the unsafe operation of motor vehicles;"3 68 (3) any law
"which requires physicians or professional nurses to be properly licensed in order to
practice their profession;" 369 (4) any provision of the state Public Safety or Welfare
Codes, or similar provisions, "which prevents the endangerment of the health or
safety of persons in facilities which are licensed or supervised" under state and local
law; 370 (5) any provision of state or local law which requires the safe construction or
operation of schools or other buildings visited by members of the public; 3 7' (6) any
general provision of state or local law whose purpose is to prevent the endangerment
of health and safety; 372 and (7) any law which requires the reporting of child abuse
364. The quotedSee id. This language in this paragraph was derived from 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2406 and is
typical of state RFRAs.
365. There is a growing controversy over whether the federal RFRA's relief section applies as a defense
in suits between private citizens. See, Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Provides a Defense in Suits by Private Plaintifs, 99 VA. L. REv. 343 (2013). This issue falls outside the scope
of this article.
366. See, 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (defining a "person" protected by the statute to include such entities).
367. See id. § 2406(b)(1). Conceivably an adherent wishing to obtain an exemption for the use of controlled
substancesubstances or illegal drugs, as a sacrament, might invoke Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao Do Vegetal 546 U.S. 418 (2006) discussed. See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text. Although
in rare cases such a claim might succeed, the health and safety preemption contained in the proposed law should
adequately cover this circumstance. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is extremely unlike that whatever
sacramental purpose a felony or misdemeanor graded drug might serve, use of such substances would not arise
in K-12 educational settings since they are typically used, as in Gonzales, during religious services.
368. See 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2406(b)(2). This provision would not ordinarily apply to home-schooled
students. However, where a home-school became a private school, as defined bystate law, then such schools
would be subject to the transportation requirement of this Act.
369. See id. § 2406(b)(3).
370. See id. § 2406(b)(4).
371. See id. § 2406(b)(5).
372. See id. § 2406(b)(6).
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and maltreatment or educational neglect of a child.3 73
4. Targeting Religious Accommodations in K-12 Educational Settings
Table 1 above is helpful in showing those conflict areas that require legislative
redress. 374 Since it is unlikely that these conflicts will abate any time soon, they are
the most obvious targets for legislative reform. A potential legislative solution for
each of these areas is discussed below.
(a) Group Meetings and Religious Practices
Perhaps the most obvious and least controversial target for the proposed statute
would be permitting devotional activities in public schools. The Act would: (1)
permit, as of right, students to participate in voluntary group devotional activities
during non-instructional time before, during,375 and after school,376 but no student or
public employee would be allowed to coerce another student to participate in the
devotional activities; (2) require that no on-campus student devotional group could
be led or directed by any public school employee, but public employees would be
permitted to monitor such group activities for the purpose of ensuring student safety
and good order, just as they are under the Equal Access Act (EAA);377 and (3) permit
student participants to select their own leaders so that they are adherents to the
group's faith, if that is the choice they make, despite non-discrimination provisions
373. Much of the language in this paragraph was drawn from 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2406 (b). The provisions
of the Act regarding transportation would not ordinarily apply to home-schooled students. However, where a
home-school became a private school, as defined in state law, then such schools would be subject to the
transportation requirement of the Act. See id. § 2406(b)(7).
374. See Table 1 and supra note 359 and accompanying text.
375. Study halls and other quasi-instructional situations would have to be addressed by state legislatures.
The safer course would simply be to treat them as academic periods since they are designed for that purpose,
even though that purpose may not always be achieved.
376. Typically, this would occur just prior to or after normal school hours, or perhaps during recess periods,
when no instruction or other curriculum-mandated activities are occurring. Such a rule should obtain for other
groups with philosophical, social, or other common values which lead to their association.
377. See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074(f) (1984). The EAA gives non-curriculum related
groups access to public secondary schools during non-instructional time (before and after school) to engage in
religious, political, and philosophical kinds of discussion. See id. § 4071. EAA only applies to school districts
which receive federal financial assistance. See id. § 4071(a). The law is triggered when a school district has
created what the EAA terms a "limited open forum" by allowing one or more non-curriculum groups to meet
on school premises for expressive purposes. See id. § 4071(a)-(b). The Supreme Court held in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1999), that the EAA does not violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 248-49. Notably, the EAA does not limit the First Amendment rights of individual
students to come together voluntarily during the school day for religious expression on school grounds, as long
as it is done in a non-disruptive manner. See Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex.
1992). In 2007, Texas adopted the Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act (RVAA), which tracks the
EAA, but goes beyond it, since the RVAA applies to elementary as well as secondary schools and during the
school day. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.151-25.156 (West 2007). The issue in implementing the RVAA
will be balancing religious expression and exercise with Establishment Clause concerns. See Argyrios
Saccopoulos, Note, Analysis: The Religious Viewpoints Antidiscrimination Act, 14 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 127,
135-41 (2008) (questioning constitutionality of the Act on the ground it enables students to use school property
to subject classmates to unwanted sectarian and proselytizing prayer during student addresses, thereby creating
coercive elements, among other reasons).
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otherwise applicable in the school district policy. 378
Where students ask for the opportunity to participate in devotional activities of
the kind described in (1)-(3) above, school officials would be obligated to furnish a
room or rooms for such purpose, if such space is available, but school officials could
require students to show written parental permission for such activity prior to
granting consent for any student's participation in those activities.37 9 Despite this
provision, school officials would be required to take steps to curtail any student
activities which would cause disruption of their educational programs or physical
harm to student, staff, or faculty, or involve the harassment of students based on their
race, national origin, gender, gender identity or sexual orientation, religious
affiliation, and any social or political beliefs to which those students might subscribe.
(b) Curriculum Accommodations
(1) Instruction
The goal in this section would be to enable the parents to direct the upbringing
of their children consistent with their religious beliefs or consciences, while ensuring
the state's interest in achieving the students' acquisition of mandated curriculum
content is satisfied. The components of this provision would allow: (a) students, upon
written authorization from a parent or guardian, to be excused from class attendance
where the content, or manner of presentation of the content, is objectionable to the
parent or guardian on the ground of religious conviction or conscience, but such
excusal would not relieve the student from the responsibility of learning the facts and
theory of such curriculum content, knowledge of which would be acquired through
home instruction, on-line, or other means selected by the parent or guardian; (b)
students whose parents elect to excuse them from particular class attendance under
this provision would not be excused from demonstrating knowledge of the
curriculum on the same basis as other students for purposes of acquiring course
credit, or passing from grade-to-grade, but such students would not be required to
endorse, approve, or declare agreement with any scientific theory, or endorse any
practice which may be implicated by such theory, which is inconsistent with his or
her religion or conscience; (c) the required curriculum accommodations would
include but not be limited to: religious or spiritual practices depicted in reading series
or literature assignments; history or social science courses depicting content
378. Such coherence of values in the associational selection process would apply as well to associations
based upon political or social philosophies. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 858
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that although the school district was entitled to have an open admissions policy for EAA
sanctioned clubs, a religious group could apply restrictions to its president, vice president, and music
coordinator), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040 (1996); Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 2866 (2009), overruled by Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. V. Humphries, 131 S.Ct. 447 (2010)
(holding that requiring student religious group to have nondiscriminatory membership qualifications did not
violate the group's religion or the EAA, which only protects speech-based restrictions on religious groups).
379. Since most public school students at the the elementary and secondary level are heavily scheduled
and the time which expires between periods is short, this requirement should result in few difficulties. These
provisions would more likely require administrative time during lunch hours and periods immediately before
school commences.
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religiously objectionable to the parents; health curriculum, including human
anatomy, human reproduction, sexuality, sexual practices, and contraception;
computer and technology skills;38 0 acceptance of alternative life styles, including
same sex marriage and related issues; evolution and creationism; AIDS awareness;
mandatory community service; valedictory and other speeches by students; speech
and drama classes;381 annual applications for religious accommodations; and
religiously based holiday music.
(2) Curriculum Delivery
Educational agencies would be required to make available curriculum content
and class assignments on-line as an instructional resource for private and home-
schooled students.
Private or home-school teachers should be able to explain to the students what
concepts are being taught in public schools, while explaining how those principles
may be distinguished from students' religious precepts. In all but the most insular of
religious communities, this should give religious adherents sufficient latitude in
prescribing their faith-based beliefs to their children while allowing state secular
goals to be achieved. Indeed, as a practical matter, parents and their agents will
indoctrinate their children into their belief systems regardless of any conflicting
secular values. Moreover, in this media- saturated world, it is nearly impossible to
isolate students from exposure to worldly activities and knowledge of the kind to
which religious adherents object. This compromise affords appropriate respect and
dignity to religious believers while permitting the state to fulfill its pedagogical
functions.
(3) Flag Salute and Pledge of Allegiance
A school district and its agents and employees would be forbidden from requiring
any student to salute the American or state flag, or other governmental symbol, or
otherwise engage in any other patriotic exercise, including reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance to the United States, which conflicts with the student's religious
convictions or conscience. In the same vein, students wishing to be excused from
such participation would be afforded the right to either stand or sit quietly during the
exercise without penalty or recrimination of any kind.382 This rule would not forbid
380. See Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) (affording an accommodation,
based on religious objections, to use of technology in school setting).
381. In a case originating in a post-secondary setting, one court ruled that a former student in a state
university's actor training program raised sufficient factual questions to defeat the university's motion for
summary judgment on her Free Exercise Claim. Axon-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). The
student, who followed the Mormon faith, had refused to use profanity in a class exercise, despite the fact the
language was contained in a script, because it forced her to violate her religious beliefs. Id. at 1281-83. The
issues raised were: (1) whether strict script adherence imposed on the student was part of a neutral program of
general applicability under Smith, or whether it was a pretext for religious discrimination and (2) if the program
was neutral and generally applicable, whether the case fell into Smith's hybrid or individualized-exemption
exceptions. See id. at 1293-99. The fact question arose because exemptions from class requirements had
previously been granted for non-secular reasons. See id. at 1298-99.
382. This rule would be easy to implement, involve minimal administrative time, and comports with
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the school from teaching about the history or policy rationale in the adoption of such
practices, or prevent any school from adopting these or other patriotic exercises
consistent with the students' protected First Amendment rights.
(4) Dress and Grooming Rules
Students would neither be prevented from wearing nor required to wear any
religious garb or symbols where that choice results from the student's genuinely held
religious beliefs, so long as it does not disrupt school operations, interfere with the
rights of others, or pose a material threat to the student's health and safety or that of
others.383
(5) Scheduling of Classes and Release Time
Publically enrolled students would be entitled to be released from mandatory
public school attendance for the purpose of receiving instruction at a private secular,
nonsecular, or home-school not earlier than one hour prior to the end of the scheduled
academic instructional day, nor more than one time in any school week; but this
accommodation would not relieve the early-released student from fulfilling the same
course requirements as other publically enrolled students. 384 Where the appropriate
missed work could be presented to parents through study sheets or extra-help classes
or other suitable means, consistent with district practices, schools would be obligated
to furnish these materials to the parents. Moreover, such support should be given to
release-time students on an equal basis to that received by other students getting the
same for non-religion based reasons.
No school district would be required to undertake any transportation expense to
effectuate a student's early release program. The student would be permitted to be
absent from school on mandatory days of religious obligation.
(6) Compulsory Vaccination Programs
Unlike many areas of contention between certain religious adherents and state
educational agencies, excusal from compulsory vaccination programs gives rise to a
established case law.
383. See Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 1982); Cheema v. Thompson,
67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). Menora is an excellent example of a thoughtful treatment to this kind of problem.
There, the wearing of bobby pins to secure a religious head covering posed a safety threat. Menora, 683 F.2d at
1032-33. The circuit court returned the case to the district court to determine if a less dangerous alternative was
available to secure the headgear. Id. at 1035. Presumably, a piece of tape would have allowed the
accommodation without the risk to injury to someone's head or eyes and allow the students to satisfy the
commands of their religion. In the same vein, see Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884-86 (9th Cir. 1995).
There, the court's nuanced approach in addressing the students' religious needs to wear kirpans and the school's
safety objective led to a similar outcome.
384. The duration and frequency of such release time is beyond the scope of this article. This should be a
legislative determination following fact finding. The use of one hour, one time per week is just illustrative; it
does not necessarily strike the right balance between accommodation and fulfilling the agency's educational
mission. In any case, make-up work could be provided and the content covered on the district's web-site as a
matter of course.
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truly compelling state interest. The failure to inoculate students from serious diseases
poses substantial risk to the exempted students and other persons with whom they are
educated. Unless the student could show he would suffer serious health risks by virtue
of inoculation, which risk would be substantiated by the school's physician, no
accommodation to such request should be granted. Where such accommodations
are granted, the public school's physician would determine, in consultation with
school officials, how instruction should be received by the student, based on the
health risk factors to others and the pedagogical needs of the student. an setting
thatproviders' needs
(7) Private and Home Schooled Students
(a) Academic Programming and Privately Educated Students
The Act should state what rights privately educated pupils enjoy. This would
include, at minimum: (1) recognizing private secular, private nonsecular, and home-
schooling programs as acceptable alternatives to public schooling, where they
promote defined state educational standards; (2) ensuring that permitted alternative
education includes K-12, which is consistent with state compulsory attendance age
constitutional or statutory requirements; (3) granting course credit, even for courses
infused with religious teaching, so long as the secular content of the applicable course
covers curricular requirements for that subject;386 (4) permitting students enrolled in
a private secular, nonsecular, or home-school programs to enroll in any course
offered by a public secondary school on the same basis as publicly enrolled students,
but such privately enrolled secular, nonsecular, or home-schooled students would be
required to show they have satisfied any course prerequisites for such enrollment on
the same basis as publically enrolled students; (5) allowing students enrolled in the
alternative educational program to participate in interscholastic and intrascholastic
programs on the same basis as public enrolled students; (6) forbidding a public school
or state educational agency from preventing students enrolled in private secular,
nonsecular, or home-school programs from thereafter enrolling in public schools and
receiving transfer credit for their secular studies undertaken at such secular, non-
secular, or home schools, but such private secular, nonsecular, or home-school
385. See, e.g., Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Program Violate the
Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73 (2011) (arguing that based on scientific evidence, non-medical
exemptions from vaccinations jeopardize the health gains achieved by state mandated vaccinations for
communicable diseases, and that religious exemptions violate the Equal Protection and Due Process rights of
children who do not have an exemption, since they are compelled by state laws to attend school and be exposed
to the risk of communicable disease); John D. Lantos et al., Why We Should Eliminate Personal Belief
Exemptions to Vaccine Mandates, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 131 (2012) (arguing that personal belief
exemptions from immunization requirements are unjust based on scientific evidence that failing to immunize
puts exempt students and other students at risk for potentially dangerous diseases); Elizabeth J. Chen, Note,
Equal Protection: Why the HPV Vaccine Should Be Mandated for Both Boys and Girls, 38 WAsH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y. 289 (2012) (supporting HPV vaccination mandates for boys and girls and arguing for gender neutral
policies as a more effective means of reducing incidents of HPV-related cancers).
386. Governmental entanglement could be avoided by simply evaluating students' progress on assessments
prepared by the school district in core educational areas and setting standards equal to those required in public
settings for granting course credit.
2013-14] 145
Journal of Legislation
students could be required to take academic examinations or other assessments
covering the content of the courses for which they wish to receive credit, so long they
are administered on an equal basis to students transferring from secular, nonsecular
or home school settings; 3 87 and (7) requiring students attending private and home-
school programs to pay for their educationally related transportation expenses, but
those students could not be excluded from transportation furnished by the school
district in which they reside when similar transportation, or reimbursement for
transportation expenses, is given to similarly situated privately schooled or home-
schooled students who participate in private education for secular reasons.
(b) Academic Monitoring and Privately Educated Students
All parents would have the right to elect home-schooling as an alternative for
their children of compulsory attendance age, but conferral of this right would not
prevent educational agencies from reasonably monitoring, by the least intrusive
means, the educational attainment of home-schooled students to ensure they are
receiving the minimum education required by the state.3 88
(c) Interscholastic and Intramural Athletics and Privately Educated
Students
No student who is enrolled in a private secular, nonsecular or home-schooling
program could be prevented from participation in interscholastic or intramural
athletic programs in the school district in which he resides so long as that student is
otherwise qualified to participate on that team or program.
No private secular or non-secular school could be prevented from joining an
athletic league on account of its status as a private secular or non-secular school, so
long as such school meets all other criteria reasonably necessary to ensure fair
competition within such league.3 89
5. Public Employees Exercising the Right to Direct the Upbringing of their
Children
No applicant or employee could be denied any employment opportunity or suffer
any workplace discrimination on account of that applicant or employee having
enrolled or intending to enroll his or her child in a private secular or nonsecular school
387. This would legislatively overrule cases like Murphy v. State ofArkansas, 852 F.2d 1039,1043-44 (8th
Cir. 1988), where a distinction was made between home schooled and privately schooled pupils in granting
transfer credit upon return to the public school setting. See id
388. Quarterly evaluations at school or at home, as decided by the parents, could be part of any such
program. This would allow for progress reports which correspond to the issuance of report cards and permit
adjustments to the students' instructional program where needed, or, in extreme cases, removal from the
alternative program.
389. Typically, criteria such as the size of the high school and prohibiting high-pressure recruiting tactics
apply. See, e.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 531 U.S. 288 (2001)
(upholding sanctions against private academy for recruiting violations and rejecting claim that athletic
association's rule violated free speech provisions of First Amendment).
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or home schooling alternative.
C. Civil Actions
Any statutory scheme that tries to protect religious liberty in K-12 educational
settings must contemplate a range of issues typically confronted during the litigation
process. They must address, at least, jurisdiction, notice of claim, pleading, claims
and defenses, limitation periods, remedies, including awards of fees and costs. Each
of these is discussed in turn.
1. Jurisdiction
A person alleging a violation of the Act by an educational agency would be
entitled to bring an action in the state superior or equivalent court of general
jurisdiction, where subject matter jurisdiction would exist and venue would lie in
accord with the applicable state rules. However, where the defendant is the state
educational agency and the agency is located in excess of fifty miles from the school
district where the claimant resides, the claimant would be permitted to file the claim
in the closest court of competent jurisdiction to the residence of the claimant.
2. Notice
A person would not be required to file a notice of claim, or otherwise give notice
of intent to bring suit, as a condition precedent to the bringing of a lawsuit where the
claimant alleges that an educational agency has placed a religious burden on the
claimant not permitted under this Act. The failure to give such notice though could
be a factor in a court's limiting an award of compensatory or exemplary damages
pursuant to this Act.
3. Pleading
An actionable claim pursuant to this Act could be stated where: (a) the person's
free exercise of religion in a K-12 educational setting, as set forth in this Act, has
been or is about to be burdened, interfered with, restricted, or limited by an exercise
of the agency's governmental authority; 390 (b) the claimant describes the act or
refusal to act which has burdened, or will burden the person's free exercise of
religion, with enough specificity for the educational agency to understand the nature
of the claim and the time frame in which it arose, however, where these requirements
are not satisfied, the right to replead would be granted as a matter of right where it
appears that the requirements of the Act may have been violated; and (3) the claimant
states the manner in which the exercise of the governmental authority burdens,
390. This language is intended to overcome the tendency in the RFRA decisions to narrow what are
considered burdens on religious exercise and therefore minimize the range of protected religious practices
covered under the RFRAs. See, Lund, supra note 1, at 484-89 and discussion supra notes 220-248 and




interferes with, restricts, or limits the person's free exercise of religion.
4. Burden of Proof
Claimants would be required to show a burden on their religious exercise under
the Act by a preponderance of the credible evidence. No heightened pleading
requirement could be imposed on the claimant at any stage of the proceeding. Upon
a claimant pleading a cause which satisfies the requirements set forth above, the
defendant would be required to allege in its answer a compelling health and safety
reason for denying the accommodation asked for by the claimant in order to prevail
in its defense, unless an exception contained in the Act applied.
5. Rights Not Limited by the Act
The rights described in this Act would not limit the right of a person whose
religious liberty is burdened by a K-12 educational agency to assert a claim under
any state RFRA or other statute previously or later enacted, insofar as they may be
applicable to the facts of the case unless such later Act specifically limited the
provisions of this Act. The Act would be construed to supplement, not supplant, any
other remedies available to a claimant.
6. Claim or Defense
A person whose free exercise of religion has been burdened, or likely will be
burdened, in violation of the Act may assert that violation against an educational
agency as a claim or defense in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
7. Mandatory Settlement Conference
Within 30 days following service of the complaint upon the educational agency,
the agency would be required to conduct a settlement conference at the school district
in which the claimant resides. Each party would be entitled to be accompanied by its
attorney and required to participate. The agency would be required to give at least 10
days written notice to the claimant(s) of its intent to hold the conference, and offer
alternative dates and times at which the conference could be held. Where the school
district fails to make a good faith attempt to conduct the conference within the
specified time, the claimant would be allowed to proceed with prosecuting the claim
and the requirement for participation in a settlement conference would be deemed
waived by the educational agency.
At the conference, all parties would be mandated to explain the nature of their
positions and the reasons therefor, but none of the information received by any party
during the conference would be admissible in evidence or in any later judicial or
administrative proceeding. The fact of holding the settlement conference and the
failure to reach an agreement at the conference would not be admissible in support
of a claim or defense in any later judicial or administrative proceeding.
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8. Limitations
The state statute of limitations in civil rights proceedings would apply under the
Act but that period could not be less than one year.
9. Remedies
If a person asserts a claim or defense in accordance with this Act and proves, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the person's free exercise of religion has been
burdened, or likely will be burdened in violation of the Act, a court would be
authorized to award the person such declaratory or injunctive relief as may be
appropriate. Courts could award compensatory monetary or exemplary damages for
a violation of the Act, but, in the case of exemplary relief, such damages could be
awarded only if the court found that the actions of the educational agency were
malicious, dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious. A prevailing party would be entitled to
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. In granting an award of such fees, the Court
shall be required to follow the criteria set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which would be
incorporated by reference into this Act.391
D. Publication Required
The state educational agency would be required to write a plain language version
of the statute, which would be produced and distributed to all local educational
agencies throughout the state. The statute and its plain language version would be
required to be displayed prominently on bulletin boards in each school under the
school district's auspices and posted on the agency's web-site. The statute and plain
language version would be included in the agency's student handbook, and be
explained to all teachers and non-certificated staff, at least annually, prior to the
commencement of each school year and to all students upon their commencement of
the school year, not later than the first two weeks following the start of the school
year.
The foregoing provisions should offer adequate protection for K-12 students in
exercising their religious rights, and should overcome the deficiencies in legislative
RFRA drafting and judicial failures to apply RFRAs as they were intended to be
applied. The specificity of the Act, along with its notice provisions and its removal
of procedural obstacles, should go a long way in solving this seemingly intractable
source of conflict. The Act's provisions respecting injunctive and declaratory relief,
damages, fees, and costs, implemented as they are in other civil rights conflicts,
should result in school officials being more amenable to early resolution of these
disputes. The Act would allow educational agencies to achieve their important
educational mission while accommodating the religious needs of students and their
families.
391. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs), passed by Congress in 1993
and by eighteen states to date after the federal enactment, were intended to overcome
the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Smith. Smith applied to Free Exercise claims
low-level rational basis scrutiny to neutral laws of generally applicability even when
their effects burdened religious exercise. Smith effectively overruled Sherbert, which
required states to show that a law that substantially burdens religious exercise is
justified by a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
The purpose of the RFRAs was to return Free Exercise protections to what legislators
considered to be the halcyon days of the post-Sherbert pre-Smith era.
This article shows that the assumptions underlying the RFRAs were erroneous,
and resulted in a substantial failure in achieving legislators' goals both within and
without K- 12 education. This article did so by building upon the research performed
by Ryan, Lund, Witte, Jr., Nichols and James W. Wright. This study revealed that:
1. Congress and the enacting state legislatures failed to examine judicial
decisions under Sherbert before adopting RFRA standards. Under Sherbert
(1963-1990) and after Smith (1990-2013), the success rate of plaintiffs
during each era did not differ statistically from one another, either when all
claims were aggregated (6.1% v. 9.2%), or when Free Exercise claims were
examined separately. No meaningful differences in success rates for the two
eras occurred when claims were asserted under Due Process, Equal
Protection, or hybrid theories. By adopting standards that had already failed,
legislators essentially guaranteed the RFRAs would fail as well.
2. The legislatures did not make findings as to which activities were more likely
to result in conflict with persons wishing to exercise religious freedom and
legislate in those areas. This perpetuated conflict which continues today.
3. The legislatures passed laws which: (a) did not distinguish state interests
merely serving a governmental purpose from those that were essential to
fulfilling educational agencies' core functions; (b) did not point with
particularity to the specific protections afforded religious adherents; and (c)
used language which focused on legal technicalities, such as "substantial
burdens" on religion and the "compelling state interest test," which are
largely bereft of meaning outside of particular agency interests. Thus, judges
had limited guidance for determining what legislatures hoped to accomplish,
and were vested with unwarranted discretion in determining the reach of the
RFRAs.
This article proposes elements of a model statute directed at K-12 educational
settings to overcome RFRA deficiencies. The proposed law contains a statement of
legislative findings and purpose, and describes protected areas of religious exercise.
These are: group meetings and religious exercise, accommodations in curriculum and
instructional delivery, flag salutes and the Pledge of Allegiance, dress and grooming
rules, class schedules and release-time programs, student health and safety, the rights
of private and home-schooled students (including academic programming, academic
monitoring, interscholastic and intermural athletics), public educational employees'
right to direct their children's religious education, and publication and dissemination
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of rights embodied in the law.
The Act covers as well issues that are likely to arise when the rights of students
under the proposed Act have been violated and litigation ensues. This includes
jurisdictional and notice of claim and claim and defense pleading requirements,
statutes of limitations, and remedies for violations of the Act, including fees and
costs.
This legislative proposal embodies principles which are intended to: (1)
overcome, within Establishment Clause limits, the unfair burdens which religious
believers have experienced; (2) allow educational agencies to perform their core
pedagogical functions; (3) give express notice to educational agencies of what they
are required to do and what conduct of theirs is proscribed; and (4) encourage
religious tolerance.
THE END
Appendix: United States Courts ofAppeal K-12 Religious Accommodations
Decisions
Data Base: 1963-2013
1. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965). Cornwall v. State Bd. of
Educ., 314 F.Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), affd 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1970).
2. Jackson v. Cal., 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972).
3. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1972).
4. Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F.Supp. 1208 (S. D. Tex. 1972),
aff'd 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980).
7. Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980).
8. Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980).
9. Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980).
10. Windsor Park Baptist Church v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 658 F.2d 618
(8th Cir. 1981).
11. Church of God (Worldwide, Texas Region) v. Amarillo Indep. Sch. Dist.,
511 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affd sub nom. Church of God
(Worldwide Texas Region) v. Amarillo Ind. Sch. Dist., 670 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.
1982).
12. Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982).
13. Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1987).
15. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987).
16. Griffin High Sch. v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
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17. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, cert. denied 484 U.S.
1066 (1988 (6th Cir. 1987).
18. Smith v. Bd. of Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 844 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1988).
19. Mason v. General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. Murphy v. Ark., 852 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1988).
21. New Life Baptist Church Acad. v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940
(1st Cir. 1989).
22. Vandiver v. Hardin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).
23. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist.. 21 of Wheeling Twp., 980 F.2d 437
(7th Cir. 1992).
24. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., Coll. Of Veterinary Med.,
5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).
25. Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1994).
26. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1044 (1996).
27. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
28. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839 (2d2dCir. 1996).
29. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir.
1996).
30. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997).
31. Peterson v. Minidoka Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351, amended by
132 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997).
32. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
33. Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2001).
34. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
35. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
36. Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., 332 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2003),
rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 75 Fed. App'x, 982, cert. denied,
Smith v. Barrow, 540 U.S. 1005.).
37. Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 75 F. App'x 815 (2d Cir. 2003).
38. Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004).
39. Barrett v. Stuebenville City Sch., 388 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2004).
40. Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys Point Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 123 F. App'x 493
(3d Cir. 2005).
41. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g sub nom. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist. (PSD),
447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006).
42. Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d I (2d Cir. 2006).
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